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The campaign leading up to the general election on 8 February 2020 in Ireland was 
eventful and its result unanticipated. Ireland’s usual bipartisan voting trend was 
broken with the Sinn Féin party winning the most first preference votes for the first 
time since August 1923. Throughout the twentieth century, the Sinn Féin party 
mostly lay dormant. It began its continuous contesting of elections in 1987. However, 
ten years later in the last general election of the twentieth century, Sinn Féin’s 
support had only risen to 2.5%. Since then, the party has slowly gone from strength 
to strength with its percentage of first-preference votes breaking the threshold of 
double digits in February 2016 with 13.85%.  
 
This thesis examines the potential reasons for the leap of over 10% in first-
preference votes in the space of one general election seen by Sinn Féin. It looks at 
the social media tactics of the party in comparison to those (or lack thereof) of the 
Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil parties. It examines the messaging of these three parties 
with reference to each party’s manifesto. Since the economic crash of 2008, Ireland 
has seen itself in the grips of health and housing crises. The effects of this on the 
Irish electorate will also be explored with reference to the strong front bench of the 
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
 
The general election in Ireland which was held on 8 February 2020 was a 
momentous event. Not only was it the first time an Irish general election was held on 
a Saturday since 1918, it was also the first time since the general election of June 
1927 that a third party outside of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael reached over 20% of the 
first-preference vote-share of the Irish electorate. In the general election in 
November 1992 and that of February 2011, the Labour party reached just under 20% 
but did not break this threshold. The Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael parties have been 
the main contenders in a dual-party Irish political system until the general election of 
February 2020 when Sinn Féin surpassed both parties with 24.53% of first-
preference votes. Figure 1 (The Irish Times, 2020) displays the percentage of first-
preference votes in the February 2020 election. Fianna Fáil received 22.18% of first-
preference votes and Fine Gael received 20.86%.  
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This leap in popularity is made more surprising due to the fact that the Sinn Féin 
party received 9.5% of the vote-share at the local elections and 11.7% at the 
European elections which were both held on 24 May 2019 (The Irish Times, 2019). 
The party won 81 seats which is 78 fewer than the previous local election results in 
2014 and a loss of 49% of its total number of seats (The Irish Times, 2019). The 
most recent general election before February 2020 was held on 26 February 2016. 
According to the 2016 Results Hub of The Irish Times website, Fine Gael received a 
majority of the vote-share with 25.53%, Fianna Fáil received 24.35%, Independents 
received 20.01% and Sinn Féin arrived in fourth place with 13.85%.  
 
This thesis will examine the following research question:  
 
What Contributed to Sinn Féin’s surge in popularity during the 2020 general 
election campaign in Ireland? 
 
There is a gap in the research due to the short time that has elapsed between the 
general election in February 2020 and the time of writing. Little academic research 
has been released on the possible causes behind the outcome of the 2020 election. 
This research will look at the campaign of Sinn Féin leading up to the 2020 election 
as well as events which may have worked in favour of the party during this time and 
in the preceding years. The social media tactics of Sinn Féin, Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael will be analysed as well as the influence of Sinn Féin’s front bench politicians 
on public opinion. The aftershocks of the economic crash of 2008 will also be 
discussed with particular emphasis on the current health and housing crises in 
Ireland.  
 
In an interview with the author on 17 June, Journalist and Author Deaglán de 
Bréadún, made the point that “[i]t's not that long since Sinn Féin people were banned 
from TV and radio and didn't get much space in the newspapers either, by and 
large”. Enabled by the powers bestowed upon him under the Broadcasting Act of 
1960, Gerry Collins, the then Minister for Posts and Telegraphs signed an order in 
October 1971 which instructed broadcast media to refrain from broadcasting “any 
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matter that could be calculated to promote the aims or activities of any organisation 
which engages in, promotes, encourages or advocates the attaining of any particular 
objective by violent means” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 1971). “A new directive in 
1976 extended the application of the ban to a number of political organisations, 
including Sinn Féin” (Maillot, 2004, p. 76).  
 
Maillot (2004) believes that as a result of this ban and misinterpretations of its 
jurisdictions in the coming years, the media “contributed to cornering Sinn Féin into 
an image where it was, solely, the political wing of the IRA by only covering stories 
that related to the IRA and by ignoring the party’s involvement in social or economic 
issues” (p. 76). In the years after the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) 
which ended the conflict in Northern Ireland, “although Irish public opinion generally 
associated Sinn Féin with a violent past, it was nevertheless beginning to exonerate 
the party for this because of the role it played in the peace process” (Maillot, 2004, p. 
82).  
 
Many former members of the Sinn Féin party have been linked with the Republican 
movement in Northern Ireland and the party-members’ involvement was a prevailing 
narrative with regard to Sinn Féin before the appointment of Mary Lou McDonald as 
leader of the party. The previous leader, Gerry Adams has been repeatedly accused 
and detained on suspicion of his involvement in the IRA during the conflict in 
Northern Ireland. The February 2020 general election was the first of its kind with 
McDonald as leader of the Sinn Féin party after Adams’ tenure of nearly 35 years. 
This generational shift has allowed the party to distance itself further from the 
Northern Ireland conflict and in 2020 helped the party in portraying itself as a 
genuine contender for government in the Republic of Ireland.  
 
In Chapter II a brief history of the political landscape of Ireland in the twentieth 
century is provided. This chapter will also look at the political climate in Europe in 
recent years with particular focus on the Podemos party in Spain and the Syriza 
party in Greece who followed a similar journey to that of Sinn Féin. Chapter III will 
detail the type of research undertaken for the purpose of this thesis. It will discuss 
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the mixed methods research used and why it was necessary. The three largest 
political parties of the 2020 Irish general election, Sinn Féin, Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael have been chosen as subjects in this research.  
 
In ‘The General Election and after’, Molyneux (2020) claims that since the 2008 
economic crash, much of the Irish electorate began to perceive Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael as “identical twins who promote the same policies, looking after the rich and 
privileged” (p. 5). Ireland was one of five countries who needed a formal bailout “after 
the government rescue of its banking sector in turn provoked a run on government 
debt” (Hopkin, 2020, p. 166). The years which followed were privy to austerity 
measures and Ireland experiencing “the deepest recession in the industrialized world 
between 2007 and 2010, with a GDP decline of 21 percent and fiscal deficits of up to 
12 percent” (Hopkin, 2020, p. 166). According to Hopkin (2020), the people of Ireland 
saw an increase in living expenses and experienced a decrease in median wages of 
3% (p. 167). 
 
Hopkin (2020) claims that the differences in experiences of varying social groups 
“conditioned the type of political reaction that resulted from it” (p. 169). Fine Gael’s 
manifesto and campaign slogan in 2016 was “Let’s Keep The Recovery Going” (Fine 
Gael, 2016). By this point, many people had not felt the recovery that the party 
wished to continue. Failings of Fianna Fáil with regard to the economic crash and the 
subsequent austerity measures were still fresh in the memory of the Irish electorate. 
Fine Gael received a marginal majority in 2016 and entered a confidence and supply 
arrangement with Fianna Fáil. The years that ensued saw health and housing crises 
worsen in Ireland. This is examined in Chapter IV with reference to Sinn Féin’s 
campaign of ‘change’ and why it resonated with the Irish electorate.  
 
Also discussed in Chapter IV is the possible aforementioned generational shift within 
the party. De Bréadún outlines disadvantageous interviews experienced by Adams in 
2016, whereas “Mary Lou didn't have any self-damaging interviews of that nature as 
party leader in the latest election”. In an interview with the author on 22 June, Sinn 
Féin’s current Spokesperson for Agriculture and Director of Elections for the 2016 
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election campaign, TD Matt Carthy states that in 2016 “a big part of the focus was 
unfortunately trying to respond to the attacks that were coming on us, as opposed to 
being able to be proactively outlining our own message”. He discusses how this was 
not the case in 2020 and the research outlines tactics employed by the party to 
effectively disseminate its primary messages. The expertise of its front bench 
members on contentious issues in the eyes of the Irish electorate also seem to have 




CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT: 
In Sinn Féin, A Hundred Turbulent Years, Brian Feeney (2002) describes Sinn Féin 
as the public face of the republican movement” (p, 12). Sinn Féin was founded in 
1905 by Arthur Griffith. Its name translated into English means ‘We Ourselves’. The 
party was established in a politically tumultuous time in Ireland when the nation was 
under British rule and between its second (1893) and third (1912) attempts at 
passing a Home Rule bill. Home Rule was the demand for a domestic parliament to 
be established in Ireland in an attempt to return governance to the nation.  
 
The First World War began in 1914 and an Irish Republican rebellion was organised 
for Easter 1916. Despite the military defeat of the 1916 Easter Rising, it was a pivotal 
time in the nationalist campaign to free Ireland from British rule: “The Easter Rising 
actually strengthened the insurrectionists. Most survived, gained retrospective 
approval and political credibility, and were released within a year, astonishingly free 
to resume and recruit” (McGarry, 2003, p. 34). The main groups who carried out the 
Easter Rising were The Irish Volunteers, The Irish Citizen Army and Cumann na 
mBan. In ‘Paramilitary Politics and the Irish Revolution’, Hart (2003) states that “Sinn 
Féin was reorganised and republicanised in 1917” (p. 28).  
 
Despite denying mutual affiliation, “[i]ndividual [Irish Volunteer] members were 
encouraged to work for Sinn Féin in elections, and many units acted as guards for 
speakers and polling booths”, (Hart, 2003, cited in McGarry, 2003, p.28). Hart also 
notes that many of The Volunteers left the militia to pursue a career in politics. The 
Irish Volunteers “evolved into the IRA [Irish Republican Army] during the war of 
independence” (Ferriter, 2013). The IRA henceforth survived in different capacities. 
There was a “split in Sinn Féin in 1970” (Gallagher, 2009, p. 421) over the issue of 
abstentionism in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland parliaments. The “two 
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competing wings of the republican movement came to be known as the Official IRA/ 
Official Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA/ Provisional Sinn Féin” (De Bréadún, 
2015).  
 
Patterson (1990) describes former Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams as “the central 
figure in the development of the strategy of the Provisional republican movement 
since the mid-1970s” (p. 5). Adams served two prison sentences in the 1970s for his 
involvement in the IRA. He was detained in 2014 for questioning for four days over 
his alleged involvement in the IRA murder of Jean McConville in 1972. Although 
Adams denies his involvement with the IRA, while leader he was seen as “a human 
reminder to potential Sinn Féin voters of the dark days of the IRA” (De Bréadún, 
2015). Adams succeed Ruairí Ó’Brádaigh as leader of the Sinn Féin party in 1983 
and “[b]y 1986 his political and ideological domination in the movement was strong 
enough to allow a resolution against abstentionism to be passed at the Sinn Fein 
ArdFheis (annual conference)” (Patterson, 1990, p. 6). 
 
The following year, Sinn Féin began to consistently contest elections. In 1987, Sinn 
Féin received less than 2% of the Irish vote and did not have a party member elected 
to the Dáil. Patterson (1990) writes that “Gerry Adams argued that the 1987 election 
came too soon after the anti-abstentionist decision at the 1986 ArdFheis” (p. 16). He 
also blamed the restrictions on the party under Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act, 
1960 which excluded Sinn Féin from the airwaves. Patterson (1990) describes the 
resurrection of Sinn Féin as an attempt “of the early Provisionals to incorporate a 
new active role for the political wing of the [republican] movement… to enlist the 
support of the masses and particularly the working class in the Irish Republic” (p. 5). 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the ‘Armalite and the ballot box’ strategy was 
pursued.  
 
After the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998, a ceasefire was called and the 
decommissioning of paramilitary groups was due to take place. The International 
Monitoring Commission was set up in 2004 “[t]o monitor and report on the continuing 
activities of paramilitary groups” (International Monitoring Commission, 2011, p. 7) in 
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Northern Ireland. It (2011) stated that the Provisional IRA decommissioned in 
September 2005 and “between June 2009 and February 2010 the UVF/RHC, the 
mainstream and South East Antrim element of the UDA, the Irish National Liberation 
Army (INLA) and the Official IRA all decommissioned their weapons” (p. 11). Despite 
this, the Commission (2011) acknowledges that dissident republican groups are still 
“brutally active” (p. 11).  
 
1.2 IRISH GENERAL ELECTION TRENDS, 1918-2020:  
In the first general election in Ireland in 1918, Sinn Féin won 73 out of 105 Irish seats 
in the House of Commons in Westminster. However, due to Sinn Féin’s policy of 
abstentionism, the party did not take these seats. Subsequently the first Dáil was 
formed and met on the 21st of January 1919.  
 
Westminster passed the Government of Ireland Act, 1920 which granted Home Rule 
to Ireland and created two parliaments, one in Dublin and one in Belfast. A general 
election was held in December of 1922 in which Sinn Féin won 124 seats out of 128 
in the south parliament of Ireland, seats which the party took an oath not to occupy. 
The next general elections took place in August 1923 and September 1927 in which 
Sinn Féin won 44 seats and 5 seats respectively. After the War of Independence, 
Sinn Féin split into two sides: pro-treaty and anti-treaty. Pro-Treaty Sinn Féin 
became Cumann na nGael in 1927 (later Fine Gael) and the Anti-Treatyites formed 
Fianna Fáil in 1926. Sinn Féin went into a “state of electoral dormancy” (Gallagher, 
2009, p. 205) and did not contest an election from 1927 until 1957.  
 
In December 1957, “the IRA began a fresh campaign of violence in Northern Ireland, 
triggering a government clampdown but also, it seemed, reinvigorating some 
traditional republican sympathies” (Gallagher, 2009, p.129). Sinn Féin won 4 seats in 
the 1957 general election in Ireland. However, still bound by an oath, the elected 
Teachtaí Dalaí (TDs) did not take their seats in government. In the following election 
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of 1961, Sinn Féin ran candidates, however they did not win any seats. Gallagher 
(2009) notes that “the republican tide that had taken Sinn Féin to four seats in 1957 
had clearly ebbed” (p.169). 
 
After the split in 1970, the majority group downplayed “traditional nationalism in 
favour of a left-wing analysis of Irish society” (Gallagher, 2009, p.420) and was 
commonly referred to as ‘Official Sinn Féin’. It changed its name to Sinn Féin The 
Workers’ Party (SFWP) in January 1977. In April 1982 it changed its name to ‘The 
Workers’ Party’ and it “merged with Labour in 1999” (Gallagher, 2009, p. 221). The 
minority group of the split became the current Sinn Féin Party and resumed 
contesting elections in 1987. Figure 2 (Gallagher, 2009; The Irish Times, 2020) 
demonstrates the trajectory of Sinn Féin, Fine Gael, Fianna Fàil and Labour in the 
general elections from February 1987 to February 2020. 
 












1987 1989 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 2016 2020
% first preference votes
1987-2020
Fianna Fáil Fine Gael Labour Sinn Féin
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In 2020, Fianna Fáil won 38 seats (37 elected and the Ceann Comhairle, Seán 
Ó’Fearghaíl, who was not up for re-election), Sinn Féin won 37 seats and the most 
first preference votes, Fine Gael won 35 seats, and Labour won 6 seats. 
 
1.3 RECENT ‘POPULIST’ TRENDS IN EUROPE:  
Fernández- Garcia and Luengo conducted a study on so-called ‘populist’ parties in 
Western Europe. They (2017) concluded that in Southern Europe and Ireland, “the 
threat to the political establishment comes mostly from the radical left (Podemos, 
Syryza, Sinn Féin People Before Profit, Left Bloc and Unitary Democratic Coalition)” 
(p. 57). Referencing Mudde (2004), they (2017) define populism as an ideology split 
into two sides, “‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’” (p. 58), the former arguing 
“that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the 
people” (p. 58). Spain’s Podemos Party and the Syriza party of Greece followed a 
similar trajectory to that of Sinn Féin on their journey to electoral success. Both 
parties were also part of the five countries who received formal bailouts after the 
2008 economic crash.  
 
1.4 THE PODEMOS PARTY:  
The Podemos party entered the Spanish political scene on 17 January 2014. Within 
two years, it became “an unavoidable player in the Spanish political arena” (Nez, 
2017, p 113). Four months after its inception at the European elections of May 2014, 
Podemos received “nearly 8 per cent of the votes (i.e. more than 1.2 million) and five 
MEP seats” (Nez, 2017, p. 113). The year 2015 became pivotal for the party. 
Podemos ran for election in Spain’s regional elections, achieving third place in nine 
of the 15 regions. Nez (2017) describes Podemos’ performance as an “historic 
breakthrough” (p. 114) as the party established itself as the third national party “with 
20.66 per cent of the votes and 69 MPs” (p. 114).  
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Before the emergence of Podemos, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Psoe) and 
the conservative right-wing Popular Party (PP) “alternated in power since the 
restauration of democracy” (Nez, 2017, p. 114) in the late 1970s. With the arrival of 
the economic crash in 2008, Spain went through an economic and social crisis. In 
tandem, the country also saw a “crisis of legitimacy of the political parties and elites.” 
(Nez, 2017, p. 115). Pre-2008, Spain’s economic success was largely attributed to 
strong growth in the construction and public-works sectors. Its collapse “led to an 
explosion of the rate of unemployment soaring from 8.57 per cent in 2007 to levels 
systematically above 20 per cent since 2010.” (Nez, 2017, p.115). This resulted in a 
deluge of housing evictions which the Victims of Bankruptcy Platform estimate was 
“more than 360,000 between the beginning of the crisis in 2008 and the first quarter 
of 2012” (Nez, 2017, p. 115).  
 
The wealth gap increased in Spain as a result and “the wealthiest 20 per cent now 
possess[ed] 7.5 times more wealth than the poorest 20 per cent whereas the ratio 
was 5.5 in 2007” (Nez, 2017, p. 116). Psoe and PP were implicated in numerous 
corruption cases connected to the housing speculation which led to the economic 
crash in 2008. By “2014 there were around 1,700 law-suits for political corruption in 
Spain and more than 500 people were prosecuted.” (Nez, 2017, p.116).  One case 
implicated Mariano Rajoy, Prime Minister from 2011-2018, “who is thought to have 
received 25,200 euros a year over 11 years” (Nez, 2017, p. 116). He was forced to 
step down after a vote of no confidence against him was passed in 2018. There was 
a loss of confidence in elected representatives and political parties in Spain which 
gave birth to the 15-M movement (anti-austerity movement).  
 
The political and economic crises in Spain provided an opportunity for Podemos. 
Sola and Rendueles (2017) refer to the 15 M movement as “the “catalyst for massive 
demonstrations against the austerity policies that took place over the next two 
years.” (p. 5). Subsequently, the Podemos party emerged “over the rubble of the 
economic and political crises, with the wind of the 15M in its favour” (Sola, 
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Rendueles, 2017, p .7). The already well-known Pablo Iglesias was appointed its 
leader. At the time of appointment, he was “a 36-year old university professor with a 
long engagement in activism” (Sola, Rendueles, 2017, p .7). According to Sola and 
Rendueles (2017), “it is no exaggeration to say that Iglesias’ visibility constituted the 
main asset of the party” (p. 7).  
 
Pablo Iglesias is widely referred to as a "charismatic leader” (Sola, Redueles, 2017; 
Nez, 2017). Sarah Bienzobas who worked on Podemos’ campaign for the 2014 
European elections claims “everyone can identify themselves with Pablo Iglesias” 
(cited in Nez, 2017, p. 124). Iglesias frequently appeared on general public 
programmes and debates which played a “central role in sending out the message of 
the candidature to places that would have been impossible to reach in any other 
way” (Fernández-Albertos, 2015, cited in Nez, p. 52). Other figureheads within the 
Podemos party included Iñigo Errejón, a 32-year-old political strategist and Teresa 
Rodríguez, “a secondary school teacher aged 34” (Nez, 2017, p. 120). As stated by 
Nez (2017), Podemos won the support “of voters in widely differing social and 
occupational categories as much among the middle classes as within the working 
classes” (p. 125).  
 
Sola and Redueles (2017) categorise Podemos as “without any doubt, a European 
version of ‘left-wing’ populism” (p. 10). They (2017) detail how its electoral mandate 
was typical of a traditional alternative left-wing party: “restructuring of foreign debt, 
tax reform, progressive state intervention in the economy, women’s rights” (p.10). 
Despite this, a key strategy and reason behind Podemos’ success was the 
avoidance of presenting itself as an alternative left-wing party: “In other words, 
Podemos has adopted a left-wing populist strategy precisely by avoiding any 
reference to populism and to the left.” (Sola, Redueles, 2017, p. 11). Jorge Lago a 
sociologist and member of Podemos’ culture commission explains this strategy:  
 
 13 
I tried to show, from a theoretical point of view, that there is a way of having 
the traditional speeches one is used to [in militant spheres] made intelligible 
by translating them into a more inclusive language [...]. For example, “anti- 
capitalism” or “economic democracy” means almost the same thing but the 
first expression frightens whereas the other does not.  
(cited in Nez, 2017, p.121) 
 
The Podemos Party positioned itself as the embodiment of change in Spanish 
politics. The name Podemos translates to ‘We can’ “and the slogan taken up from 
the anti-housing evictions movement and the anti-austerity movement (Sí se puede, 
‘Yes, we can’) emphasise a real opportunity for change” (Nez, 2017, p.123). Iglesias 
built on this by frequently categorising the Spanish political system as “on the one 
hand, the partisans of austerity and on the other the promoters of change” (Nez, 
2017, p. 122).  
 
Fernández-Garcia and Luengo (2017) illustrate strong similarities between Sinn Féin 
and Podemos in terms of their respective anti-elitist rhetoric, taxation policies, 
equality for those considered more vulnerable in society. They both target “big 
corporations and bankers” (Fernández-Garcia, Luengo, 2017, p. 67) and promote 
the sovereignty of the people against the current political class. In Power Play, The 
Rise of Modern Sinn Féin, before the success of Sinn Féin in the 2020 election, De 
Bréadún (2015) recognises that Sinn Féin’s trajectory was coinciding “with the 
emergence of Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain as major electoral forces”.  
 
1.5 THE SYRIZA PARTY: 
At the Sinn Féin Ardfheis in March 2015, one of the guest speakers was Syriza’s 
soon to be Minister for Finance, Euclid Tsakalotos. Introduced by MEP Lynn Boylan, 
she praised Tsakalotos and the Syriza party as “a government that has shown how 
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you stand up for your people” (Sinn Féin, 2015). Tsakalotos spoke about the 
similarities between the issues faced by the Greek and Irish societies. He 
proclaimed:  
 
Syriza and Sinn Féin as well as others [such] as Podemos are part of a 
great realignment in European politics that has become apparent over the 
last couple of years. That realignment is a necessity exactly because we 
have such a crisis in the existing arrangements, in which traditional parties 
are unable to address effectively their social base on an agenda of wages, 
jobs and welfare. 
(Sinn Féin, 2015) 
 
Syriza, meaning Radical Coalition of the Left was founded in 2004 as a coalition of 
parties with “the party Synaspismos (Coalition of the Left of Movements and 
Ecology) the key component” (BBC News, 2015a). Before the economic crisis of 
2008, Syriza “had managed to establish a strong presence within social movements 
and activist initiatives, yet remained a marginal force, polling around 4-5% at the 
national level” (Katsambekis, 2015, p. 154). Up until this time, Katsambekis (2015) 
states that the middle classes “were still relevantly well off, maintaining a reluctant 
attachment to Pasok and ND” (p. 154).  
 
In 1974, Greece transitioned to democracy with “a remarkably stable political 
system, structured around two main pillars: on the left, the Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement (PASOK), a social-democratic party with populist roots; on the right, New 
Democracy (ND), a liberal-conservative party” (Aslandis, Kaltwasser, 2016, p. 1078). 
The economic crisis in 2008 lead to a social, economic and political crisis which 
resulted in “a major readjustment of the party system” (Aslandis, Kaltwasser, 2016, 
p. 1077). Aslandis and Kaltwasser (2016) describe the chronic misallocation of funds 
which forfeited the general welfare of the people of Greece while contributing “greatly 
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to the mountain of sovereign debt that became unmanageable after 2009” (p. 1078). 
The incumbent ND party lost its majority in government in a snap parliamentary 
election in 2009 “passing the hot potato straight to George Papandreou, the social-
liberal president of PASOK and Socialist International” (Aslandis, Kaltwasser, 2016, 
p. 1078). A similar situation befell Ireland when Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael went from 
47% and 20% first-preference votes respectively in June 2008 to the general election 
of 2011 when Fine Gael became the majority party with 36% of the first-preference 
vote to Fianna Fáil’s 17%.  
 
In the 2009 parliamentary election, Syriza “collected 4.6 percent and 13 seats” 
(Lansford, 2015, 562) which was 0.4% less than it had received in the 2007 
parliamentary elections. Lansford (2015) attributes Syriza’s inability to benefit from 
the social, political and economic upheaval at the time to its failure “to provide a 
convincing alternative” (562). Papandreou refused to relinquish fiscal sovereignty 
and increased austerity measures as a condition of the bailout which “sparked a 
wave of large demonstrations and unceasing strikes, culminating with the massively 
popular Greek indignados movement in May 2011” (Aslandis, Kaltwasser, 2016, p. 
1078). Papandreou resigned as Prime Minister of Greece in November 2011 and a 
“technocratic government took over to enforce austerity with the backing of ND and 
LAOS [Popular Orthodox Rally party], a small populist radical-right party” (Aslandis, 
Kaltwasser, 2016, p. 1078). Syriza and its junior partner, the Independent Greeks 
National Patriotic Alliance (ANEL) were in opposition from 2012- 2015 and during 
this time “became a government-in-waiting” (Aslandis, Kaltwasser, 2016, p. 1088). 
 
According to Aslandis and Kalwasser (2016), the Greek political sphere left voters 
feeling betrayed, “abandoned or deceived” (p. 1078) which provided Syriza with an 
opportunity to challenge the long-established bipartisan system. Much of Syriza’s 
electoral success is attributed to its “young and popular leader, Alexis Tsipras” 
(Aslandis, Kaltwasser, 2016, p. 1077). The “40-year-old radical” (Smith, 2015) 
became Greece’s youngest leader when Syriza won the January 2015 parliamentary 
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election. Tsakatika (2016) stated “electoral campaigns, increasingly after 2012, were 
focused to a considerable extent on [Tsipras’] person” (p. 19). A Syriza 
communications strategist purports why: “We had a charismatic leader who is… 
young, no one can attribute anything to him from the past, he has a strong critique 
against corruption” (cited in Tsakatika, 2016, p. 19). 
 
As well as being charismatic, the party leadership expanded its social reach by 
frequently appearing in the public eye presenting, explaining and debating “the 
party’s economic strategy in the mass media while attacking the mainstream parties’ 
economic strategies with knowledgeable, technically sound and politically 
sophisticated arguments” (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 17). Syriza discredited the sitting 
government on its acceptance of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which 
set out “an extensive package of austerity measures and structural reforms that 
Greece would need to implement in return for a 110 billion euro ‘bail-out’ loan” 
(Tsakatika, 2016, p. 5).  
 
Syriza presented itself as the historical successor of the National Liberation Front 
(EAM) who organised the Greek resistance against German occupation. Manolis 
Glezos, “octogenarian hero of the resistance against German Occupation” 
(Tsakatika, 2016, p. 14) was seen in the ranks of Syriza. As a party of coalitions, 
Syriza was able to present itself “as a unifying, rather than sectarian, political project” 
(Tsakatika, 2016, p. 21). Syriza also promoted renegotiating the MoU in a way “that 
does not entail leaving the EU or the Eurozone” (Tsakatika, 2016, p. 23). This 
endorsed Syriza’s image of unification and helped the party to appeal to many 
different social categories. 
 
Papanikolopoulos and Rongas (2019) write that Syriza was helped by “the 
increasing polarization between the ruling mainstream parties on the one hand and a 
wide range of hard-hit social groups” (p. 185) as a result of subsequent austerity 
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measures after the economic crash of 2008. After winning a majority in the Hellenic 
government in January 2015, a referendum was held on 5 July in Greece to accept 
or reject the conditions of the third bailout offered to Greece by the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(Troika). Despite a majority of the Greek public voting against these conditions the 
Syriza party signed a new bailout memorandum which was accompanied by new 
austerity measures “contrary with its promises for putting an end to the austerity 
policies” (Papanikolopoulos, Rongas, 2019, p. 193). Tspipras “lost his majority in 
August” (BBC News, 2015b) in government and called a snap election in September 
2015. Tsipras was re-elected and the Syriza party lost four seats.  
 
1.7 CONCLUSION:  
De Bréadún (2015) refers to Sinn Féin as having been “the pariahs of Irish politics” 
until the twenty first century. In the cases of Podemos and Syriza, choice of 
leadership was an integral element of their respective electoral successes. Like 
Iglesias and Tsipras, McDonald is praised for her charisma and confidence. Harry 
McGee (2013) writes in The Irish Times that “[t]here are few politicians who impress 
TDs from rival parties more than McDonald. She is a great communicator, 
authoritative and focused”. Fiach Kelly (2020) describes her as “warm, friendly and 
approachable, and this came across in broadcast coverage of her daily walkabouts” 
during the 2020 campaign.  
 
Both Spain and Greece were hard-hit after the 2008 economic crash, the effects of 
which could still be seen when the Podemos party and the Syriza party won a 
majority in the respective Spanish and Greek general elections. There was also an 
atmosphere of austerity in Ireland after the 2008 economic crash. After financial 
prosperity was ostensibly restored, the Irish public still found themselves in health 
and housing crises by 2020. Sinn Féin benefited from this atmosphere of discontent. 
Like Podemos and Syriza, Sinn Féin’s portrayal of Ireland became one of the elite 
versus the average worker. Their manifesto (2020), which was launched on 28 
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January was given the title ‘Giving workers & families a break, A Manifesto for 
Change’ (p. 1). The title of the introduction is ‘Time for Change, Time for Sinn Féin’. 
It (2020) details the last 100 years, during which time the people of Ireland have had 
“Governments for the wealthy, Governments for the privileged, Governments for the 
property developers, Governments for the banks” (p. 3).  
 
Similar to Spain and Greece, there had been a long-established dual-party system in 
Ireland which had been in place for nearly 100 years. Sinn Féin (2020) coupled Fine 
Gael with Fianna Fáil and presented itself as the best alternative: “a government for 
the people” (p. 3). Sinn Féin’s politicians emulated this rhetoric frequently in the 
public eye during their campaign prior to the general election. One well known 
example is when McDonald accused the Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil Parties of being 
one and the same and referred to their leaders as “Tweedle Dum and Tweedle Dee” 
(Claire Byrne Live, 2020).  
 




CHAPTER III – METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW:  
In order to determine the possible influences on Sinn Féin’s popularity in the 2020 
general election, it was necessary to perform both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis. This chapter will discuss the benefits of mixed methods research with 
reference to the research question. It will also examine the methods used and their 
benefits as well as ethical considerations with the associated research methods.  
 
1.2 MIXED METHODS RESEARCH:  
“Quantitative research often seeks through measurement to test hypotheses, to 
determine outcomes and to draw generalizable conclusions... Qualitative research 
tends to be interpretivist and seeks to understand a phenomenon in its context in 
greater depth” (Lietz, Zayas, 2010). Tashakkori and Creswell (2007) define mixed 
methods research “as research in which the investigator collects and analyzes data, 
integrates the findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches or methods in a single study or a program of inquiry” (p. 4). According to 
Bryman (2006) it is becoming increasingly common to use mixed methods research 
in recent years (p. 97). Creswell, Fetters and Ivankova (2004) believe that “[w]hen 
used in combination, both quantitative and qualitative data yield a more complete 
analysis, and they complement each other” (p. 7).  
 
This thesis will use both quantitative and qualitative research methods to achieve 
complete and complementary data. Social media is regarded as having been an 
important tool in the 2020 general election in Ireland. In order to gain an insight into 
each party’s performance on social media and the public’s opinion of the party, the 
social media account metrics of each party formed the basis for the quantitative 
research. The qualitative research of this thesis will take two forms: content analysis 
of party manifestos and interviews with party members and industry professionals.  
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1.2.1 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH: 
The quantitative research methods used in this project will be through social media 
analytics platforms Socialbakers and CrowdTangle. Socialbakers boasts “the largest 
social media data-set in the industry” (Socialbakers, 2020). It is primarily used as a 
“social media marketing partner” (Socialbakers, 2020). However, its ability to monitor 
“over 8 million business profiles across all major platforms including Facebook, 
Twitter, Youtube, Pinterest, LinkedIn, Instagram, Google+ and VK.com” 
(Socialbakers, 2020) made it an asset in the research for this thesis. As a result, a 
comprehensive analysis of Facebook, Instagram and Twitter was conducted on the 
profiles of Sinn Féin, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil. Computer programs such as 
Socialbakers and CrowdTangle “substitute rapid and comprehensive searching 
supported by software for the uncertain and slow process of manual searching and 
filing” (Basit, 2003, p. 145).  
 
In order to understand any trends and/ or new tactics employed by each chosen 
political party, a period of six months prior to the general election was examined. The 
decision was taken to examine the three political parties in Ireland who received the 
most first-preference votes in the 2020 election: Sinn Féin, Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael. Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil have held a majority in the Irish government since 
1927. Much like the political situations of Spain and Greece, in 2020 Sinn Féin was 
in a position to challenge the long-held majority of these established political parties 
in Ireland. Public following of certain pages and reactions to social media posts can 
help to indicate public opinion of the associated political parties. In determining what 
party was the most popular in this regard, it is possible to discern what social media 
tactics seem to have been more effective than others and who these tactics were 
used by.  
 
On Socialbakers, the custom timeline, 4 August 2019 (week beginning) until 8 
February 2020 was selected. The profile of each party’s social media account on 
Facebook, Instagram and Twitter were added. Once generated, a report can be 
downloaded directly from the website. Different categories are included depending 
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on the social media platform. For example, for Facebook accounts, the following 
data is available: average interactions per post, evolution of interactions, average 
most engaging post types, user activity, number of interactions per 100 fans, number 
of page posts, number of fan posts, most engaging posts overview, growth of total 
fans, share of posts, share of interactions, socially devoted and response time 
segments for user. It also provides insights on the posts created by each party and it 
will inform the researcher of the top six posts within the given timeframe. If the post 
in question is a video, it is possible to see how many views the video received. It is 
also possible to view the comments on each post and organise these comments into 
the most reacted to. It is possible to view these posts directly through Facebook. 
However, the option of ‘most relevant’ comments available directly through 
Facebook is subjective because the comments from users you may have a 
connection with will appear first. Socialbakers displays the most popular/ most 
reacted to comments, thus making it possible to objectively examine the public 
reaction to the posts of each account.  
 
CrowdTangle is operated in a similar way to Socialbakers and provides similar data 
but for Facebook and Instagram only. The main difference for this research was the 
ability of CrowdTangle to produce reports with the reactions broken down into the six 
possible categories: like (👍), love (❤), haha (😂),  sad (😥) wow (😲), and angry (😡). 
Therefore it was possible to discern the amount of positive versus negative 
responses to each post. CrowdTangle was also used to obtain data on follower-
changes (which account had the most/ least followers at the start of the six month 
timeline and who gained the most/ least followers prior to election day).  
 
“The user must still create the categories, do segmenting and coding, and decide 
what to retrieve and collate” (Basit, 2003, p. 145). Due to the large amount of 
information available from both Socialbakers and CrowdTangle, it was necessary to 
refine the results into relevant categories. For the purpose of this research, the 
following category results were gathered and analysed for the Facebook accounts of 
Sinn Féin, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil from 4 August 2019 to 8 February 2020: page 
likes, total interactions, reactions (broken down into like, angry, love, sad, haha, 
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wow), comments, shares, post-count, video post count, total owned video views, 
average views per video. Pages likes are the amount of likes the page received. 
Interactions refer to the total amount of comments, shares and reactions for a post. It 
is possible to select six different types of reactions from like to wow. Post-count and 
video post-count refer to the total number of posts and videos posted respectively 
during the time frame. Average views per video was not a category in the 
downloaded reports but was possible by dividing the total number of views by the 
amount of videos posted.   
 
Instagram and Twitter do not allow for the same range of data to be gathered due to 
the smaller number of options available to a user when reacting to a post. For 
Instagram, the results were organised into the following categories: followers, 
follower-growth, post-count, video post-count, likes, comments, video views, total 
interactions, interactions per post. It was not possible to categorise the reactions into 
positive versus negative due to the fact that the only reaction available apart from 
commenting is to like a post. Therefore, the sole purpose of analysing each party’s 
Instagram and Twitter accounts was to examine which party had the highest 
following on the platform. Please see Appendices A- E for the breakdown of each 
result category for all three parties and their leaders on each platform.  
 
A content analysis was performed on each party manifesto to inform the research as 
to the rhetoric used by each party and the habits of each party to criticise other 
parties, self-endorse or lay out its programme for government. A search for certain 
words was also run, the full list can be found in Appendix F. During the content 
analysis phase, certain words seemed to be repeated more often in some 
manifestos than others. As a result, lexical trends began to appear and were 
categorised accordingly. Basit (2003) writes “Coding or categorizing the data has an 
important role in analysis. It involves subdividing the data as well as assigning 
categories” (p. 144). As well as performing word searches to determine any specific 
type of rhetoric, each sentence was categorised into one of three categories: self-
endorsement, criticism of other parties/ the current situation in Ireland, priorities once 
in government. Once this was done, the total of each was divided into the word count 
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to discern each party’s propensity percentage- wise towards each of the categories. 
Key Word in Context (KWC)  analysis using the word as the unit of analysis was 
performed. 
 
1.2.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH:  
“Qualitative methods are often regarded as providing rich data about real life people 
and situations, and being more able to make sense of behaviour and to understand 
behaviour within its wider context” (De Vaus, 2014, p. 6). For this project, the main 
forms of qualitative research will be obtained through content analysis and 
interviews.  
 
Fernandez-García and Luengo (2018) performed a content analysis of party 
manifestos in 2018 to gauge whether or not a group of parties ascribed to core 
elements of ‘populism’. The manifestos of the parties in question were examined 
regarding the presence of “an intense anti-establishment discourse (one of the core 
elements of populism)” (Garcia, Lueno, 2018, p. 60). Sinn Féin was one of the four 
parties and was the highest out of four for its anti-establishment rhetoric.  
 
The research for this thesis was performed on the newest manifestos of Fine Gael, 
Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin to discern which party contained the highest amount of 
anti-establishment rhetoric. Sinn Féin topped this list as well as Garcia and 
Luengo’s. The layout of each manifesto was also studied in order to examine the 
simplicity or complexity of the manner in which each party informed the public of its 
proposed programme of government. A content analysis was performed on the three 
manifestos to compare and contrast key policies in health and housing.  
 
Interviews were conducted with industry-leading journalists, a political scientist and a 
member of the Sinn Féin party who held the position of Director of Elections for the 
previous general election in 2016 and is the party’s current Spokesperson for 
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Agriculture. Each interview was recorded with the permission of the participant and a 
transcript was produced in each case. Due to added restrictions as a result of 
COVID-19, each interview was conducted over the phone. The resulting 
commentaries helped to form the basis of the thesis by contextualising the 
environment in Ireland that allowed Sinn Féin to rise in popularity in the manner it 
did. Interviewing a party member who has been closely involved in election 
campaigning provided valuable insights into changes in campaign strategies and use 
of social media platforms. Speaking with a political scientist with direct oversight of 
post-election data revealed insights into why the electorate voted the way it did. 
From reporting on events throughout the campaign and in the preceding years, the 
interviews which were conducted with political journalists were valuable by providing 
insights into what they believed had an effect on the Irish electorate in this regard.  
 
Interviewing as a form of qualitative research “is a flexible and powerful tool to 
capture the voices and the ways people make meaning of their experiences.” 
(Rabionet, 2011, p. 563). Berg (2009) believes “the interview must rely on the 
establishment and maintenance of good rapport” (p. 130). In order to do this, he has 
written his interpretation of the ten commandments of interviewing which will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
1.3 PREPARATION: 
For the purpose of this thesis, interviews were semi-structured and the following ten 
steps were consulted prior to each interview. A series of questions were composed 
ahead of each interview. The semi-structured interview “involves the implementation 
of a number of predetermined questions and special topics but the interviewers are 
allowed the freedom to digress” (Berg, 2009, p. 107). Berg (2009) has written what 
he describes as the “basic rules for conducting a decent interview” (p. 143). These 
rules were consulted in preparation for each interview:  
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1. Never begin an interview cold 
2. Remember your purpose 
3. Present a natural front 
4. Demonstrate aware hearing 
5. Think about appearance 
6. Interview in a comfortable place 
7. Don’t be satisfied with monosyllabic answers 
8. Be respectful 
9. Practice, practice, and practice some more 
10. Be cordial and appreciative 
     (Berg, 2009, pp. 143-144) 
 
Each participant was in a location of their choosing. Regardless of being in person or 
over the phone, the appearance of objectivity and professionalism should always be 
maintained. Ahead of each interview, the participant was sent an information sheet 
explaining the associated research question. The structure of the interview was 
outlined and it was made explicitly clear that the option to cease the interview at any 
point without giving a reason was available to the participant. Each participant signed 
a consent form before or after the interview. A list of questions was composed 
specifically with the participant’s area of expertise in mind ahead of the interview and 
where requested, sent to the participant to ensure they were comfortable with the 
area of discussion.  
 
1.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS:  
Potential ethical implications were considered for this project. In ‘Ethics in Qualitative 
Research’, Orb, Eisenhower and Wynaden (2001) state that despite the conflict 
between the research of a project and the rights of its participants “the protection of 
human subjects or participants in any research study is imperative” (p. 93).  
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For this research, obtaining informed consent from interview participants was 
imperative to avoid ethical issues. As the interviews were recorded, General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) considerations were included in the consent forms 
signed by the participants stating that the recordings only be held for up to three 
years and consent can be withdrawn at any point if so wished by the participant. 
Anonymity was not a clause in the consent forms for the interviews for this research 
which was made clear to participants in the participant information sheet. Orb, 
Eisenhower and Wynaden (2001), consider the relationship between the researcher 
and participant and the power structures that can come into play (p. 93). As a result, 
for this research attempts were consistently made to avoid exploiting participants. It 




Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were necessary for the 
associated thesis. It was necessary to gain figures and data related to each political 
party. As well as research conducted specifically for this thesis, it was necessary to 
obtain the figures of opinion polls prior to the election and the election results 
themselves. The interviews which were conducted in conjunction with the collected 
data contextualised the results and party-performance on social media platforms and 
in opinion polls. A fuller picture of the electorate, problem policy areas and recent 
events was gained by engaging in interviews. As well as this, a more comprehensive 
view of the campaign strategy of Sinn Féin was made clearer.  
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CHAPTER IV – ANALYSIS 
 
1.1 ELECTION RESULTS: 
On 8 February 2020, a general election was held in Ireland. 160 seats were filled in 
39 constituencies across the country with a 62.9% national turnout. Ireland operates 
under a single vote transfer system in its general elections. Out of the first 
preference votes, Sinn Féin received 24.53%, Fianna Fáil received 22.18%, Fine 
Gael won 20.86% and Labour won 4.4% (The Irish Times, 2020). In the previous 
general election in Ireland in 2016, Fine Gael received the most number of first-
preference votes with 25.52%. Fianna Fáil received 24.35%, Sinn Féin received 
13.85% and Labour received 6.61% of first-preference votes (The Irish Times, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 3: % of first preference votes in 2016 and 2010 
 
On 24 May 2019, local and European elections were held in Ireland as well as a 
referendum on easing the restrictions of divorce. For the local elections, 949 seats 
were to be filled and there was a 50.2% electoral turnout on the day. Fine Gael 








General Election 2016 General Election 2020
Percentage of first preference votes
Fine Gael Fianna Fáil Sinn Féin Labour
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received 9.5% and Labour received 5.7%. Since the previous local election in 2014, 
Fine Gael’s first-preference vote-share increased by 1.3% and Fianna Fáil’s 
increased by 1.6%. Sinn Féin and Labour both lost first preference votes by 5.8% 
and 1.4% respectively (The Irish Times, 2019). 13 seats were filled on the same day 
for the European election for which there was a 49.7% voter-turnout. Out of the seats 
assigned, Fine Gael received 29.6% of the first-preference votes, Fianna Fáil 
received 16.5%, Sinn Féin won 11.7% and Labour won 3.1%. Fine Gael was the 
only party out of the aforementioned four with an increased first preference vote-
share since the 2014 local and European elections with an added 7.3%. Compared 
to 2014, Fianna Fáil received 5.8% less first preference votes, Sinn Féin lost 7.8% 
and the Labour party lost 2.2%.  
 
1.2 IPSOS MRBI POLITICAL OPINION POLLS:  
Sinn Féin’s turnaround in public support between the local and European elections in 
May 2019 and the general election in February 2020 was substantial and has been a 
point of conversation and debate throughout and after the election campaign. On 15 
October 2019, an Ipsos MRBI political opinion poll was released. Fine Gael was in 
the lead with 29% party support, Fianna Fáil was in second place with 25%, Sinn 
Féin was in third place with 14% and Labour was in fourth place with 6% (The Irish 
Times/ Ipsos MRBI, 2019). In terms of party leadership, as well as his party, Leo 
Varadkar (Fine Gael) was in first place with a rating of 51% satisfaction, Micheál 
Martin (Fianna Fáil) received 38%, Mary Lou McDonald (Sinn Féin) was in third 
place with 30% and Brendan Howlin (Labour) received 20%. On 14 January 2020, 
the then incumbent Taoiseach Leo Varadkar announced a general election was to 
be held on 8 February. Another Ipsos MRBI political opinion poll was conducted and 
was released on 20 January which publicly saw the beginning of Sinn Féin’s 
turnaround. Fine Gael received 21%, Fianna Fáil received 25%, Sinn Féin rose by 
7% to 21% party-support and Labour received 5% (Leahy, 2020a).  
 
Two weeks later, Ipsos MRBI released a second political opinion poll in which the 
three main parties for the election were identified. The poll had a margin of error of 
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2.8% and placed Sinn Féin ahead of both Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil with 25% party 
support (Leahy, 2020b). Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil received 20% and 23% 
respectively. In the leader approval rating section of the report, between 20 January 
and 3 February, Mary Lou McDonald went from 34% to 41%, Leo Varadkar went 
from 35% to 30% and Micheál Martin went from 33% to 30%, placing Mary Lou 
McDonald in first place, along with the Sinn Féin Party (Leahy, 2020b). 
 
1.3 RESULTS: SOCIAL MEDIA: 
Dr Jane Suiter, Associate Professor at Dublin City University, has been part of a 
team conducting a report on how Ireland voted in the 2020 election which is due for 
release in September 2020. In an interview with Pat Kenny on 25 May 2020, she 
identified the three main social media outlets used by political parties during the 
2020 election campaigns as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. Suiter described 
Twitter during election campaigns as a medium mostly used by journalists, media 
professionals and political analysts whereas “Facebook is more where ordinary 
people live or Instagram if you’re younger” (The Pat Kenny Show, 2020). For the 
purpose of this thesis, Facebook and Instagram data from the three main parties and 
their leaders was analysed using data obtained from CrowdTangle and Socialbakers. 
Twitter data was researched through Socialbakers only. Out of the three platforms 
analysed Facebook garnered more activity in general among the public sphere 
during the election campaign. As a result, particular emphasis will be put on 
Facebook henceforth.  
 
1.3.1 SINN FÉIN: 
A number of quantitative analysis reports were generated for the Facebook, 
Instagram and Twitter profiles of Sinn Féin, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. The results of 
this showed that in the six months prior (up to and including) the general election on 
8 February 2020, Sinn Féin’s Facebook following and interaction was much higher 
than that of Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil. Trends on the types of posts and activity on 
and by these three pages began to emerge during this analysis. 
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The date range was set to the week beginning 4 August 2019 and election day 8 
February 2020 and the data can be viewed in Appendix A. In this time, Sinn Féin 
shared a total of 415 posts. It received 477,095 reactions, 61,163 comments and 
212,100 shares. During the six-month time period, Sinn Féin’s Facebook followers 
went from 162,706 on the week beginning 4 August 2019 to 189,705 by election day 
which is a total increase of 26,999 users and 17% of its original following. During this 
time, it posted 328 owned video posts which received a total of 13,620,905 views 
(Table 1, 2020, Appendix A). This averages at 41, 527 views per video. According to 
Facebook’s page transparency Ad Library the Sinn Féin party spent a total of 
€50,127 on Facebook advertisements from March 2019 to June 2020 (Ad Library, 
2020c).  
 
Facebook reactions are categorised under six different headings: Likes (👍), Angry 
(😡), Haha (😂), Wow (😲), Sad (😥) and Love (❤). In the context of the political 
sphere in Ireland in the six month timeframe, likes and love reactions tended to be 
positive, while angry, haha, wow and sad tended to be negative reactions. For the 
purposes of this thesis, they were categorised as such. During the six-month 
timeframe, in response to its posts Sinn Féin received 97% positive reactions and 




Figure 4: % of positive versus negative Facebook reactions- Sinn Féin 
 
The Sinn Féin party Instagram profile gained 9,794 additional followers from 4 
August 2019 to 8 February 2020. By election day, the account’s following was 
25,356. In January, the account’s following increased by 40%, the highest increase 
in the six-month time frame. From 1 February to 8 February, Sinn Féin’s Instagram 
account increased by 24% of the total increase in these six months. The account 
garnered a total of 88,745 interactions in total which averaged at 5,941 interactions 
per post. The highest amount was received in January when the page saw 25,109 
interactions. In total, the account received 86,984 likes and 1,761 comments on its 
117 posts. The account posted 32 videos which received a total of 122,589 views 
(Table 3, 2020, Appendix C). This is an average of 3,831 views per video posted. 
Instagram does not feature the categoric reaction options that Facebook does. 
Therefor the positive versus negative percentage-analysis performed on Sinn Féin’s 
Facebook posts was not possible to perform on its Instagram posts.  
 
From 4 August 2019 to 8 February 2020 Sinn Féin’s Twitter account gained 17,519 
followers with the most it gained in a single day occurring on 8 February, election 
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day. During this time, it tweeted 1,810 times. It received a total of 325,892 
interactions which included 240,160 likes, 5,591 replies and 80,141 retweets. The 
account was mentioned in tweets by other users 52,034 times (Table 5, 2020, 
Appendix E).  
 
In the local and European Elections on 24 May 2019, Sinn Féin performed poorly. Its 
social media performance was mixed. In the six months before the elections Sinn 
Féin’s Facebook following went from 156,645 to 161,488 which is a total increase of 
3% of its original following (compared to a 17% increase before the 2020 election). It 
put up 565 posts which received 249,911 interactions in total. In the month prior to 
the election, the account saw a 19.85% decrease in interactions. In total, it received 
21,500 comments and 84,106 shares, 35% and 40% lower respectively than the 
amount of comments and shares it received ahead of the 2020 election. Of its post-
count, 497 were videos which achieved 5,532,444 views which is an average of 
11,132 views per video, 30,395 less views per video than in the six months leading 
up to the 2020 election (Table 1.2, 2020, Appendix A). Despite this difference in 
performance, reactions to Sinn Féin’s Facebook posts were largely positive. Out of 
144,305 reactions 96% were positive and 4% were negative (Table 1.3, 2020, 
Appendix A).   
 
1.3.2 MARY LOU MCDONALD: 
The same six-month timeline beginning on the week of 4 August 2019 to the general 
election on 8 February was applied to the analytics of the Facebook and Instagram 
accounts of the leaders of each of the three main parties. Mary Lou McDonald has 
been the leader of the Sinn Féin party since Gerry Adams reneged the title in 
February 2018. She has a larger Facebook following than that of the leaders of 
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. On 4 August 2019, McDonald’s public page had 99,932 
likes. By election day 2020, the account had 116,660 likes which is an increase of 
17% of its original following. In this amount of time, there were 213 post which 
received a total of 174,210 interactions. In total, McDonald’s page received 28,399 
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comments and 41,382 shares. Its posts received 204,429 reactions which were 98% 
positive and 2% negative (Table 2.1, 2020, Appendix B).  
 
 
Figure 5: page likes and interactions of Martin, Varadkar and McDonald 
 
McDonald’s Instagram account is much less active than her Facebook account. By 
election day, her account had 3,505 followers. McDonald’s post-count is 17 for the 
six months prior to 8 February 2020. She had a total of 4,429 interactions, 4,303 of 
which were likes and 126 were comments. She did not post any videos, therefor her 
video views for the timeline is 0 (Table 4, 2020, Appendix D). 
 
1.3.3 FINE GAEL: 
Fine Gael’s Facebook following went from 37,278 on the week beginning 4 August 
2019 to 38,158 by 8 February 2020 which is a total increase of 880, 3% of that of 
Sinn Féin’s. During this time, Fine Gael had a total post count of 84. These posts 
received a total of 28,064 comments and 5,178 shares. The account posted 49 
videos totalling in 2,420,572 views (Table 1.4, 2020, Appendix A). This is an average 
Interactions
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of 49,3999 views per video, an average of 7,872 more views per video than that of 
the Sinn Féin account. Facebook’s ad transparency has disclosed that from March 
2019 to June 2020, Fine Gael spent €111,979 on paid Facebook advertisements 
(Ad Library, 2020b). In total, the Fine Gael account received 34,329 reactions in the 
six month timeframe before the 2020 election, 60% of which were positive and 40% 
of which were negative (Table 1.5, 2020, Appendix A).  
 
 
Figure 6: % of positive versus negative Facebook reactions- Fine Gael 
 
From the week beginning 4 August to election-day, Fine Gael’s Instagram account 
gained a total of 1,051 followers which brought the account up to 3,825 followers by 
election day. 47% of its additional followers occurred in January 2020 and 24% in the 
week prior to election day. In the date range, it had a total post-count of 49, receiving 
5,573 likes and 395 comments which is an average of 720 interactions per post. It 
posted a total of 31 videos for which it enjoyed 33,214 views (Table 3.1, 2020, 
appendix C). This is an average of 1,071 views per video posted.  
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From 4 August 2019 to 8 February 2020, Fine Gael’s Twitter following increased by 
4,226 users. The highest number of follows in a single day was 193 follows on 22 
January 2020. The account tweeted 540 times in the six month period ahead of the 
general election and received a total of 23,358 interactions of which 20,731 were 
likes, 805 were comments and 6,822 were retweets. The account was mentioned 
43,834 times in these six months in tweets by other Twitter users (Table 5.1, 2020, 
Appendix E).  
 
1.3.4 LEO VARADKAR: 
Leo Varadkar has been the leader of Fine Gael and Taoiseach since June 2017. 
Between the week beginning 4 August 2019 and election day, Varadkar’s Facebook 
following increased from 39,394 to 42,580 likes which is an 8% increase. During this 
time, the account saw a total of 64,173 interactions on a total of 77 posts. This 
includes 24,157 comments, 4,339 shares and 35,677 reactions. The highest rate of 
interactions occurred in the week prior to the election with 11 posts garnering 16,355 
interactions which was just over 25% of the page’s total interactions from the six 
month period in just one week (Table 2.2, 2020, Appendix B). Of the total reactions 
to Varadkar’s posts, 75% were positive and 25% were negative (Table 2.3, 2020, 
Appendix B).  
 
Varadkar’s Instagram-following was the strongest out of the three leaders in the six 
months leading up to the election. By election day, Varadkar had 24,792 followers. 
The total post-count was 46 of which 15 were videos. The account saw a total of 
51,864 interactions with the highest amount occurring in September 2019. During 
this month, Varadkar’s highest interaction-rate was on 25 September when he 
posted a photo with Jimmy Fallon while he was on a trip to promote investment 
opportunities between Ireland and the US. Of the total 51,864 interactions during the 
six months, 49,093 were likes and 2,771 were comments (Table 4.1, 2020, Appendix 
D). The account posted 15 videos which obtained 151,152 views which is an 
average of 10,077 views per video.  
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1.3.5 FIANNA FÁIL: 
Fianna Fáil’s Facebook page went from having 37,552 likes on 4 August 2019 to 
38,564 by 8 February 2020 which is an addition of 2.7% of its original following. In 
this timeframe, the account had a total post-count of 175 which obtained a total of 
64,711 interactions. Out of the 175 posts, 116 of them featured videos. In total, these 
videos received 3,708,253 views which is an average of 31,968 views per video, the 
lowest average out of the three parties analysed (Table 1.6, 2020, Appendix A). The 
party paid €95,740 in advertisements from March 2019 to June 2020 (Ad Library, 
2020a). The aforementioned 175 posts received a total of 22,391 comments and 
7,039 shares. There were 35,281 reaction responses of which 68% were positive 
and 32% were negative (Table 1.7, 2020, Appendix A).  
 
 
Figure 7: % of positive versus negative Facebook reactions- Sinn Féin 
 
From 4 August 2019 to 8 February 2020, Fianna Fáil’s Instagram account gained a 
total of 4,274 followers. It gained an additional 563 followers in the month of January 
which was its largest in this timeframe and nearly 44% of its total additional 
followers. The account had a total post-count of 98 which generated 5,945 likes and 
Reactions (Fianna Fáil)
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275 comments. Of the 98 posts, 49 of them featured videos (Table 3.2, 2020, 
Appendix C). The page’s total video views was 23,805 which is an average of 486 
views per video.  
 
 
Figure 8: party Instagram followers and interactions 
 
Fianna Fáil’s Twitter following increased by 4,277 users between 4 August 2019 and 
8 February 2020. The account put up 886 tweets in this time which had a total of 
19,946 interactions- 13,253 likes, 1,250 replies and 5,443 retweets. The Fianna Fáil 
Twitter account was mentioned 23,329 times by other Twitter users in this timeframe. 
Its most engaging tweet was on 14 January 2020 when it received 254 likes, 111 
retweets and zero replies (Table 5.2, 2020, appendix E). 
 
1.3.6 MICHEÁL MARTIN: 
Micheál Martin succeeded Brian Cowen as leader of Fianna Fáil in January 2011. He 
became Taoiseach of Ireland in June 2020. In comparison with McDonald and 
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January 2020. As a result, the metrics for his Instagram account are only possible to 
obtain for January and February for the purpose of this analysis.  
 
In the six months prior to the election, Martin’s Facebook page likes increased by 
just over 2% from 18,825 to 19,295 which is a total increase of 470 likes. The 
account had a total of 46 posts which generated 10,445 interactions which included 
3,122 comments, 809 shares and 6,514 reactions. 89% of the reactions on Martin’s 
account were positive and 11% were negative. During this timeframe, the account 
posted 29 videos which garnered 228,541 views (Table 2.4, 2020, Appendix B). This 
is an average of 7,881 views per video.  
 
Martin’s Instagram account was set up in January 2020. By election day in February, 
his account had 1,234 followers. Martin’s account posted a total of 12 times before 
election day. 5 of these posts were videos which generated a total of 5,332 views. In 
total, the 12 posts received 1,557 interactions, including 1,488 likes and 69 
comments (Table 4.2, 2020, appendix D).  
 
1.4 MANIFESTOS:  
 
1.4.1 LEXICAL TRENDS 
A content analysis was performed on the manifestos of Sinn Féin , Fine Gael and 
Fianna Fáil to examine any trends present in the manner in which they presented 
their policies and to decipher key policies in health and housing. Excluding page 
numbers and heading templates, the word count of the three part manifestos were 
as follows: Fine Gael had the highest word count with approximately 49,507 words, 
Sinn Féin had the second highest with approximately 47,804 words and Fianna Fáil’s 
manifesto had roughly 39,492 words (Table 6, 2020, Appendix F). A full table of the 
following word-usage analysis is available in Table 6.1, Appendix F. Sinn Féin 
mentioned its own party name 451 times. It mentioned Fine Gael directly 49 times 
and Fianna Fáil directly 42 times. It also referred to them as ‘successive (Irish) 
governments/ administrations’ seven times and used the phrase ‘Fine Gael 
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supported by Fianna Fáil’ and vice versa five times. Fianna Fáil used its own party 
name 129 times in total in its manifesto. It referred to Fine Gael directly 41 times and 
it did not refer to ‘Sinn Féin’ at all. Fine Gael used its own party name 210 times, 
referred to Fianna Fáil directly eight times and did not refer to Sinn Féin at all.  
 
Words that appear often in Sinn Féin’s manifesto and not as often in those of Fianna 
Fáil and Fine Gael were ‘workers’, derivatives of ‘failure’, derivatives of ‘equal’ and 
‘inequal’, ‘power’, ‘insurance’, ‘free’, ‘privatisation’, ‘investment’ and ‘underfunded’/ 
‘underfunding’. Sinn Féin also referred to ‘banks’, ‘bankers’ and ‘banking’ 74% more 
frequently than Fianna Fáil and 62% more often than Fine Gael. There is a sense of 
urgency in Sinn Féin and Fine Gael’s manifestos through the use of words such as 
‘immediate’, ‘immediately’, ‘urgent’ ‘urgently’ and ‘now’. This same sense of urgency 
is not as pervasive in Fianna Fáil’s manifesto. Fianna Fáil were also the most likely 
to use the word ‘citizen(s)’ and the least likely to use the word ‘people’. While Sinn 
Féin was the most likely to use the word ‘people’ and the least likely to use the word 
‘citizen(s)’. Sinn Féin used the words ‘child’, ‘children’, ‘disability’ and ‘disabilities’ 
27% more than Fianna Fáil and 44% more than Fine Gael.  
 
Despite frequently posting about Brexit on its social media, Sinn Féin mentions it the 
least out the three parties in its manifesto. Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael both mention 
‘Brexit’ 39 times while Sinn Féin mentions it 24 times. Fianna Fáil refers to the 
European Union 104 times which is more than Fine Gael and Sinn Féin refer to it 
combined (38 and 56 times respectively). Sinn Féin also refers to ‘community’, 
‘communities’ and ‘rural’ the least out of all three parties and ‘business’ and 
‘businesses’ the most. Fine Gael refers to ‘landlord(s)’ and ‘welfare’ more frequently 
than Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin. They also refer to ‘Travellers’ the least while Sinn 
Féin refers to Travellers the most out of the three parties. Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin 
use the word ‘crisis’ 27 and 28 times respectively while Fine Gael only refers to it 
eight times.  
 
A content analysis was also performed to examine how often each party spent  
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1. Criticising other parties/ situations in Ireland. 
2. Endorsing its own party. 
3. Setting out its priorities and government agendas. 
 
It was found that Sinn Féin’s manifesto spends approximately 20% of its word count 
criticising Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil. Fianna Fáil spend 12.5% of its word count 
criticising other political parties while Fine Gael spend approximately 2% of its 
manifesto criticising other political parties. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s criticisms are 
mostly aimed at each other and neither party acknowledge Sinn Féin. Fine Gael’s 
manifesto is made up of approximately 21% self-endorsements while approximately 
2% and 3% of that of Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil’s manifestos respectively are 
comprised of such. Each party spends the majority of its word count outlining its 
political agenda with Fianna Fáil discussing it the most (85%), Fine Gael the least 
(77%) and Sinn Féin in the middle (78%) (Table 6, 2020, Appendix F).   
 
The layout of each manifesto was another point of interest. The layout of the Sinn 
Féin manifesto appears to be the simplest. Excluding the foreword, each subsequent 
section is comprised of a title, a single block of text outlining current issues and Sinn 
Féin’s solutions for these issues, followed by a section at the end of bullet points 
highlighting both the solutions put forward and in many cases the reasons behind 
them. The manifesto is written in Open sans in font size 11 (Sinn Féin, 2020). 
Excluding the foreword, Fianna Fáil’s manifesto is mostly made up of two columns of 
text per page. The priorities are organised into sections of bullet points mixed with 
blocks of text pertaining to the current situation of the issue at hand. Fianna Fáil’s 
manifesto is in Circular Pro TT Book and is also in font size 11 (Fianna Fáil, 2020a).  
 
Visually the most complex manifesto layout was that of Fine Gael. Most pages 
feature three columns of text in a smaller font than that of Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil. 
The font used is Effra Light in font size 10.5 (Fine Gael, 2020) which is marginally 
smaller than those of Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin. With this font being in ‘Light’, it is 
thinner than those of Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin and as a result it is more difficult to 
read. There are also pages throughout, for example pages 95 and 96, where the text 
 41 
is white and appears on a strong-coloured background making it more difficult to 
read than black text on a white background which comprises most of Sinn Féin and 
Fianna Fáil’s manifestos.  
 
1.4.2 HEALTH AND HOUSING POLICIES 
In an interview with the author on 1 July 2020, Political Scientist at the Department of 
Government in University College Cork, Dr Theresa Reidy references data from the 
Irish National Election study after the 2020 election and states that “health and 
housing were the two most important issues in the election”. As a result, key health 
and housing policy-areas of the three parties were also examined.  
 
Sinn Féin’s solutions are mainly state-led. It (2020) proposes free healthcare and an 
“additional €4.5 billion for Current and €1.58 billion for Capital spending in our 
health services” (p. 45). The party (2020) highlight a number of benefits this would 
bring to the Irish public such as a statutory home-care scheme for the elderly; 
medical cards to be provided to all cancer-care patients; a “state-sponsored 
contraception scheme for women” (p. 46) and free hospital parking.  
 
In terms of recruitment, Sinn Féin propose hiring 2,000 additional mental health staff, 
2,500 nurses and midwives, 1,000 consultant doctors and 1,500 Primary Care 
Centre staff. The party (2020) also suggest a “moving home bursary” (p. 47) and a 
similar grant for international GPs who wish to move to Ireland. The party’s 
manifesto (2020) also promises to purchase, equip and staff new air ambulances 
and 50 new ambulances to reduce the “long and dangerous waiting times” (p. 52) 
experienced by many communities. 
 
To tackle the trolley and waiting-list crises Sinn Féin (2020) propose to invest “an 
extra €1 billion of capital and €480 million of current spending to increase the 
number of hospital beds” (p. 49) by 1,500 in their first term of Government. As well 
as hiring more health-care staff, Sinn Féin (2020) suggest introducing “Comhliosta, a 
 42 
new and single Integrated Hospital Waiting List Management System” (p. 50) to 
tackle the waiting-list crisis.  
 
At the fore of Sinn Féin’s housing policies was a reduction in and freeze of rent for 
up to three years and a three-year refundable tax credit to “put a month’s rent back 
in every renter’s pocket” (Sinn Féin, 2020, p. 65) at a cost of €301 million. They 
(2020) vow to build over 100,000 public homes “on public land to meet social and 
affordable housing needs” (p. 63) by investing an additional €6.5 billion. Sinn Féin 
proposes increasing the vacant site levy from 7% to 15% to tackle land-hoarding. 
Sinn Féin also promise to abolish local property tax and reduce mortgage rates. 
They (2020) include a Residential Tenancies Bill to link rent reviews to the 
Consumer Price Index after the rent-freeze and introduce “an NCT style certification 
to ensure compliance with building and fire safety standards” (p. 66). Under this, they 
plan 25% of all private rental properties to be inspected by local authorities every 
year. There is no mention of supports for landlords.  
 
Fine Gael’s health policy lies mainly in the implementation of Sláintecare. The party 
plans to invest an additional €5 billion per year to into health-care services in Ireland. 
Through Sláintecare, Fine Gael promises to provide 2,600 extra hospital beds and 
4,500 community beds. Fine Gael’s manifesto also discusses recruiting “3,840 
primary care workers, with recruitment of 1,000 by the end of this year” (p. 14). Fine 
Gael also promises to “provide new ambulance bases in Galway City, Mullingar, 
Cork, Limerick and Ardee” (p. 15). 
 
In terms of recruitment, Fine Gael proposes 5,000 additional nurses. The party 
(2020) also mentions raising the pay and conditions of nurses and midwives “to the 
level of therapists” (p. 15). They commit to recruiting 1,000 frontline staff in 2020 
including public health nurses and allied health professionals (occupational 
therapists, dementia advisers, speech and language therapists). The party vows to 
increase the number of GP training places to 300 by 2025 (the intake for 2019 was a 
total of 191). Fine Gael promises the recruitment of 1,000 consultants and the party 
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vows to ensure that hiring consultants will be contingent on their willingness to work 
in public hospitals (this feature will be implemented on a phased basis).  
 
Fine Gael pledge to build 35,000- 40,000 new homes every year over the 
subsequent five years. This includes more 10,000 newly built homes “at affordable 
prices” (Fine Gael, 2020, p. 67). The party promises to increase the maximum Help 
To Buy refund to €30,000 for first time buyers and self-build properties valued up to 
€500,000. Regarding landlords, Fine Gael claims to be committed to a review of the 
tax treatment of landlords as a support for smaller landlords. They also plan to grant 
the Land Development Agency a firmer statutory basis and €1.25 billion in funding 
from the Irish Strategic Investment Fund. 
 
Fine Gael (2020) plans to extend the Serviced Sites Fund to private lands where 
local authorities will fund building in “areas with a proven affordability challenge” (p. 
70). These homes will be sold to owner occupiers at a discount of up to €50,000 
which the owners will repay to the local authority “over time or upon the sale of the 
property” (Fine Gael, 2020, p. 70). Fine Gael (2020) also promise to legislate for 
30% of homes built “to be made available for affordable purchase or cost rental” (p. 
70) in addition to the current 10% minimum for social housing.  
 
In their manifesto, Fianna Fáil detail healthcare policies which will cost €310 million 
in addition to pre-committed spending commitments. To combat the trolley crisis, 
Fianna Fáil (2020a) propose aiming for a “four-hour target wait for Emergency 
Departments” (p. 37). They also pledge to provide an additional 2,600 hospital beds. 
Fianna Fáil ensures that anyone waiting more than six months for a procedure will 
be able to apply to the National Treatment Purchase Fund (a fund they also 
promised to double to €200 million). 
 
To combat the staffing difficulties in the healthcare sector, Fianna Fáil propose hiring 
4,000 additional nursing staff (including 300 GP practice nurses and 350 public 
health nurses) over the next five years at a cost of €212 million. The party also plans 
to recruit 1,000 extra consultants over these five years at a cost of €223 million. 
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Fianna Fáil (2020a) will provide an “additional 20 emergency ambulances and 200 
extra staff” (p. 38) which will cost €25.4 million. The party also pledges to increase 
GP training places to 274. 
 
Fianna Fáil (2020a) proposes to build “200,000 new” (p. 56) homes by 2025 which 
would include 50,000 new build social housing units and 50,000 new affordable 
units. The party commits to expanding the Help to Buy Scheme funding by €100 
million. They (2020a) pledge to improve the conditions for renters at a cost of €214.6 
million. Among the proposed measures is an introduction of a €600 rent tax credit for 
all private renters, a National Rent Deposit Scheme with a “life time deposit” (Fianna 
Fáil, 2020a, p. 61), and a ban on co-living. In support of landlords, Fianna Fáil also 
plan to treat local property tax as a deductible expense.  
 
Within the construction industry, Fianna Fáil (2020a) plan to “[t]arget 10,000 
apprenticeship places in the construction sector per annum” (p. 58) at a cost of 
€45.5 million. The party (2020a) promises to introduce legislation to disable single 
buyers from bulk-purchasing entire developments unless they are designated Build 
to Rent homes and reduce development levies “to stimulate construction” (p. 58). 
Fianna Fáil also plan to launch a new €50 million Vacant Fund to bring vacant 
homes back into use.  
 
All three parties’ healthcare policies pertain to elements of Sláintecare and as a 
result, contain many similar policies. However, they also differ in many proposals. 
Sinn Féin seeks free healthcare. While Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil proposed more 
spending in healthcare and increased benefits for Irish citizens, they do not offer the 
same amount as a statutory right. All three parties include a provision for medical 
cards for patients of cancer and/ or terminal illnesses. All three promise to implement 
the Scally Reports and RCOG review but only Fine Gael and Sinn Féin mention 
implementing the MacCraith Review. Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin suggest 
implementing no-fry-zones for schools. Both Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil propose free 
hospital car parking while Fine Gael suggest capping it at €10 per day. Fine Gael 
and Sinn Féin commit to state-sponsored/ free contraception for women, which 
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Fianna Fáil does not. Fine Gael offer free dental care for children under the age of 
16 and Sinn Féin offer it for children under the age of 18 which Fianna Fáil does not.  
 
Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin both promote abolishing prescription charges while Fine 
Gael (2020) suggests “reducing” (p. 14) them. All three parties propose introducing 
home care as a statutory right. However, Sinn Féin proposes an extra 12 million 
home care hours while Fine Gael (2020) promote an additional one million plus one 
million “for every year that Fine Gael is in power” (p. 19) and Fianna Fáil support an 
extra five million. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil pledge to provide free GP for those 
under the age of 18 while Sinn Féin (2020) promotes free GP care for all citizens of 
Ireland to be rolled out “over a term of Government at a cost of over €455 million” (p. 
47). All three parties include provisions for IVF treatment. Sinn Féin and Fine Gael 
support the implementation of the Human Tissue Bill while Fianna Fáil does not 
mention it.  
 
Sinn Féin, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil differ greatly in their housing policy-proposals. 
Sinn Féin’s key housing strategy is a rent-freeze with a yearly tax rebate of up to 
€1,500. The party (2020) also proposes holding a referendum to “enshrine the right 
to housing in the Constitution” (p. 63). Neither Fine Gael nor Fianna Fáil mention 
this. Fianna Fáil offers a private renters tax credit of up to €600 but its housing 
policies mainly centre around the construction industry and increasing the appeal to 
build. The opening sentence of their housing policy section reads: “Fianna Fáil is the 
party that builds homes” (Fianna Fáil, 2020a, p. 56). Despite shouldering frequent 
criticism for rising house prices creating a generation of renters, Fine Gael (2020) 
commences their housing policy section by stating that “Fine Gael is the party of 
home ownership” (p. 66). The party (2020) states that the housing reform they wish 
to bring about in communities around Ireland will move from “developer-led planning 
to more sustainable plan-led development” (p. 70). 
 
Fine Gael seems to be the most ambiguous out of the three parties in terms of 
housing policy-proposals. For example, they (2020) state that they will “continue and 
expand the Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan for a further five years with sufficient 
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finance so more people can avail of it” (p. 66). However, they fail to inform the reader 
of the specifics of this-by how much do they plan to expand; how much qualifies as 
sufficient finance? The policies they outline also largely plan to ‘continue’ measures 
that are already in place. For example, Fine Gael (2020) discusses continuing 
services such as “the national Mortgage Arrears Resolution Service, Abhaile, which 
has helped more than 12,000 households at risk of losing their homes” (p. 67). The 
use of the word continue for an electorate who has seen a housing crisis grip the 
country and homeless figures continuously rise for the last number of years may hold 
negative connotations. This ‘continuation’ occurs on numerous occasions throughout 
the housing segment of the Fine Gael manifesto.  
 
1.5 DISCUSSION: A SERIES OF FORTUNATE EVENTS FOR SINN FÉIN: 
While it is possible that the opinion polls throughout the election may have acted as 
a self-fulfilling prophecy, there were also a series of events and factors which seem 
to have coincided with Sinn Féin’s popularity-surges in these polls. On 15 October 
2019, Sinn Féin’s party-support was ranked at 14% among the public. By 20 January 
2020, it had increased to 21% (The Irish Times/ Ipsos MRBI, 2020).  
 
On 11 January, it was announced that the Northern Ireland Assembly would reopen 
“almost three years to the day after it and the power-sharing executive in the region 
collapsed” (McDonald, 2020). De Bréadún states that he believed the announcement 
of the reconvening of the Northern Assembly had “a certain influence that was 
positive in nature” on Sinn Féin’s 2020 campaign. According to him, the reason 
behind this was that “[i]t deprived their opponents of an issue that they could have 
used to damage Sinn Féin in the campaign”.  
 
On 14 January 2020, Taoiseach Leo Varadkar announced that a general election 
was going to take place three and a half weeks later on 8 February. On the same 
day, a homeless man received life altering injuries when a Dublin City Council 
industrial vehicle scooped his tent up with him inside and deposited him in the back 
of a truck. In an interview with the author on 2 July 2020, RTÉ Morning Ireland 
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Presenter, Journalist and Author Rachael English (2020) states that she believes this 
event “set the tone for a lot of the campaign”. A campaign poster of Eoghan Murphy, 
the incumbent Minster for Housing at the time, was placed on a poll directly above 
the site of this incident. It was removed the following day on 15 January which was 
announced by Murphy on Twitter: “My thoughts are with this poor man as he 
recovers in hospital. I’ve demanded a full report in to the incident which is under 
Garda investigation. My campaign poster which was located at the scene has been 
removed” (Murphy, 2020). 
  
In the aftermath of this incident, the then Taoiseach Leo Varadkar “called on the 
Fianna Fáil Lord Mayor of Dublin Paul McAuliffe to make a statement on the matter” 
(McGee, Kelly, 2020). As a result, Varadkar was accused of attempting to politicise 
the incident. Less than a week later on 20 January, the first Ipsos MRBI opinion poll 
of the 2020 campaign was released which showed Sinn Féin with 21% party-support 
(Leahy, 2020a). This was an increase of 6% and it placed the party on par with Fine 
Gael and 4% behind Fianna Fáil. According to English, henceforth it would become 
clear “that the momentum was in Sinn Fein's direction”. 
Another possible contributing factor to the party’s increase in popularity was the 
exclusion of Sinn Féin from the leaders debate between Fine Gael’s Leo Varadkar 
and Fianna Fáil’s Micheál Martin. Virgin Media News claimed at the time that 
coverage ahead of the election was “allocated on the basis of party performance in 
the 2016 general election and the local elections in 2019” (Finn, 2020). However, 
due to their rise in popularity during the campaign, Sinn Féin leaders believed that 
they had a right to be part of the leaders debates with Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil. 
Una Mullaly (2020) wrote in the Irish Times that “voters are driven more by sentiment 
than detail, and in fact a party that threatens the establishment being attacked by 
that establishment may lure the Sinn Féin-curious”. She (2020) discussed the 
legitimacy in the “power of the underdog” and how an “under-analysed aspect of the 
Irish electorate is devilment”. Justine McCarthy and Stephen O’Brien (2020) of the 
Sunday Times echoed Mullaly’s sentiments at the time and wrote that Virgin Media 
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News and RTÉ’s decision to exclude Sinn Féin from the election debates “served 
only to bolster Sinn Féin’s claim to be the lead voice against the establishment”.  
Reidy comments on Sinn Féin’s willingness to go into coalition “not just as a senior 
partner but also as a junior partner”. She believes this benefitted the party because 
all of a sudden “a vote for Sinn Fein was a vote for a party that was going into 
government”. Both Varadkar and Martin expressed their refusal to going into 
coalition with Sinn Féin at different points throughout the campaign. McCarthy and 
O’Brien (2020) discuss how Sinn’s Féin’s claim to be the lead voice against the 
establishment “was further entrenched when Varadkar said during the Virgin Media 
News debate that he was open to entering a coalition with Fianna Fáil, while both the 
big parties said they would not participate in government with Sinn Féin”.  
This reluctance is attributed to ostensible ‘shadowy figures’ which Sinn Féin are 
believed to be at the helm of. During the campaign, Martin commented:  "I could 
never be sure with Sinn Féin in terms of who you are dealing with. Is it unelected 
officials in Belfast who rule the roost, who control the levers of power within that 
party?" (cited in Carswell, 2020). In an interview with the author on 1 July, Journalist 
Una Mullally stated that this “constant commentary around their IRA past… does not 
impact Sinn Féin’s vote because the people voting for Sinn Féin don’t care about 
that, or if anything completely understand it and maybe see it in the past”.  
 
1.6 SINN FÉIN’S FRONT BENCH AND KEY POLICY-AREAS:  
De Bréadún believes that the 2020 election was a media event. Of the Sinn Féin 
front-bench, he points out that “the impression was conveyed to people that these 
were articulate politicians – intelligent and socially-concerned”. Dr Reidy believes 
that the appointment of Mary Lou McDonald was part of a “pathway to making the 
party seem like a more credible choice for government”. She claims that McDonald’s 
leadership helped by “moving the party away from its past and making a connection 
with a group of voters who would not have voted for the party while Gerry Adams 
was the leader”.  
 49 
 
The reception she received in the comments section on Sinn Féin’s Facebook page 
were largely positive. For example, on 21 January, Sinn Féin posted a video of which 
the accompanying caption read “Uachtarán Shinn Féin [President of Sinn Féin], 
Mary Lou McDonald slams Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil in a rousing speech in Dublin's 
Mansion House as Sinn Féin launches its Dáil election campaign” (Sinn Féin Ireland, 
2020d). The top comment in the replies section was: “Thats what we all needed to 
hear, I got so excited listening as if it was happening, mary Lou McDonald you can 
say it louder but not any clearer, that was brilliant”. De Bréadún describes her as “an 
accomplished media performer”. Mullally echoes this and adds that another facet of 
this discussion is the question of how McDonald “compare[s] politically in a debate 
context next to Micheál Martin and Leo Varadkar”. She comments on Varadkar’s 
poor communication skills and says that despite Martin’s affable personality, he is 
“this ghost of the crash in terms of his presence”. Mullally believes that this combined 
with McDonald’s “capacity to bundle Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil together” portrays 
her a strong female politician.  
 
McDonald and her front bench potentially represent a generational shift within Sinn 
Féin. When consulted on this matter, De Bréadún posits that because she was never 
involved in the Troubles in Northern Ireland, “she wasn't vulnerable to the same kind 
of questioning and probing and allegations that were traditionally raised with people 
like Adams and with Martin McGuinness before that”. TD Matt Carthy echoes this 
viewpoint:  
 
[W]hen people were turning on their television screens and they were seeing 
people like Pearse Doherty or Eoin Ó'Broin or Mary Lou McDonald or myself 
and others, they could clearly see that we were people of a different 
generation to those that were involved in the conflict. 
 
According to Reidy, as well as this generational shift Sinn Féin “had quite good 
policies and very good spokespersons on a couple of crucial policy-areas”. Eoin 
Ó’Broin (housing), Louise O’Reilly (health) and Pearse Doherty (finance) are among 
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those who impressed voters in the run up to the election. Dr Reidy describes Ó’Broin 
as “excellent in his communications on housing, not just during the campaign but in 
the years preceding the election”. Mullally echoes this and adds that “he has a very 
forensic and granular understanding not just of Irish housing policy and where it has 
gone wrong but good ideas elsewhere”. In 2019, Ó’Broin released a book called 
Home: Why Public Housing is the Answer which “examines the structural causes of 
[Ireland’s] housing emergency” (Ó’Broin, 2019). This helps to establish him as an 
expert in the field. Mullally comments on the “juxtaposition of that voice versus 
Eoghan Murphy who turned out to be the most unpopular and disliked minister for 
younger people”.  
 
Louise O’Reilly was Sinn Féin’s Health Spokesperson during the 2020 campaign. Dr 
Reidy describes her as “very good and very effective at communicating Sinn Féin 
policy”. O’Reilly’s counterpart was Fine Gael’s Simon Harris, the former Minister for 
Health. On 20 February 2019, O’Reilly launched the motion of no confidence against 
Harris. The motion was launched due to the overspend of approximately €450 
million in building the National Children’s Hospital, the hospital McDonald referred to 
as “the most expensive hospital in the world” (RTÉ, 2020b). On the day the vote of 
no confidence was carried out, O’Reilly listed other scandals which occurred while 
Harris was the Minister. Among these she listed the trolley crisis in Ireland’s 
hospitals, the staffing crises in Ireland’s health and mental health services, the 
industrial strike of nurses over wages and the CervicalCheck scandal. She ended 
her speech by saying “I could go on but I only have five minutes, not five hours” 
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2019a).  
 
Sinn Féin’s Finance Spokesperson, Pearse Doherty, was another popular front 
bench member of the party. He was elected to the Dáil in 2010 after winning a High 
Court case “to force the government to hold a by-election in his constituency of 
Donegal South-West” (Reilly, 2010). The constituency had been without an elected 
representative in Dáil Éireann for seventeen months by this time. Doherty has been 
commended for his work regarding the insurance industry in Ireland. On 26 
December, the Consumer Insurance Contracts Act 2019 was signed into law by the 
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President of Ireland and would have been fresh in the memory of the public by 
election day less than two months later. Its purpose is “to reform the law of consumer 
insurance contracts” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2019b) by legislating for increased 
transparency and enhanced rights for policy holders.  
 
According to RTÉ’s 2020 election results page, Doherty received the second highest 
number of first preference votes in Ireland with 21,044 votes (RTÉ News, 2020a). 
Out of the six most popular posts on Sinn Féin’s Facebook account from 14 January 
2020 to 8 February 2020, three were videos which solely focused on Doherty 
speaking on behalf of the party. The most popular video in which he appeared 
(which ranked second out of the six mentioned) on 22 January received 266,506 
views. 99.6% of the reactions to it were positive and the two top comments read: 
“Fairplay to you pearse , keep up the great work u are doing , vote Sinn Fein people, 
it's time for change 👍👍” and “Pearse Doherty is in a league of his own!!!” (Sinn Féin 
Ireland, 2020c). 
 
For previous elections, including the local and European elections 2019, Reidy 
states that “the party was seen as being opposed to everything, but not having 
solutions to anything”. Reidy believes that Sinn Féin set out to present itself 
differently to Irish voters which is where “people like Pearse Doherty and Eoin 
Ó'Broin and Louise O'Reilly and others came into play, in terms of putting forward 
Sinn Féin as an alternative party and a credible party of government”. Reidy 
discusses Sinn Féin’s state-led approach to housing whereas “Fine Gael and Fianna 
Fáil emphasised more affordable housing and even in relation to social housing, they 
were very much promoting market-based solutions”. 
 
According to the Irish National Election study, Reidy reveals that when voters were 
asked who they trusted to implement housing policy “the answer was Sinn Féin by a 
significant margin over all the other political parties”. With regard to healthcare, 
Reidy points out that most parties in the campaign promoted health policies in line 
with Sláintecare. Despite this, Reidy comments that when voters were asked “who 
do you trust most on health care, they answered Sinn Fein”: 
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[I]t seems to be the case that Sinn Fein managed to persuade voters, perhaps 
that they would be more likely to implement the reforms or that their version of 
the reforms would be more effective. But certainly voters saw Sinn Fein as 
being the more credible party on health and housing 
 
Matt Carthy, outlines that issues, “particularly around housing, health [and] public 
finances”, were priorities for the Sinn Féin party between the local and European 
elections in May 2019 and the general election in February 2020. 
 
1.7 SOCIAL MEDIA TACTICS:  
In an interview with Pat Kenny on 25 May 2020, when asked about Sinn Féin’s 
success with the electorate, the party’s Spokesperson for Finance and Director of 
Elections for the 2020 campaign, Pearse Doherty, answered “We use social media… 
we read the comments and we answer the comments… we engage with them” (The 
Pat Kenny Show, 2020). There were a number of tactics Sinn Féin used on their 
social media accounts which Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil did not do. As Doherty 
pointed out to Kenny, the party read through comments on their posts and engaged 
with them. The Sinn Féin Facebook account regularly replied to comments on their 
posts, answering questions, correcting what they saw to be misinformation and 
providing links to various sources when warranted.  
 
The Sinn Féin account also frequently involved the public by posting petitions and 
asking for their followers’ experiences with various issues. It would also frequently 
post the link to the Sinn Féin website where the public could sign up to become a 
member of the party. In the six months ahead of the 2020 election, Pearse Doherty 
personally replied to a number of comments. On 12 January 2020, in the comments 
section of a Sinn Féin post, a user accused the party of jumping on the bandwagon 
when committing to policies. Doherty offered his phone number in response by 
writing “[Facebook user] sorry to hear your view on that June. While I disagree I 
respect your opinion, I know I have led the campaign against the insurance industry, 
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Eoin o Broin on a rent rebate and Freeze, John Brady on preventing retirement age 
increases, I could go on. I’ll be in office in the morning if you want to give me a call 
would like to hear your concerns. [phone number supplied]" (Sinn Féin Ireland, 
2020b). Doherty replied to another user on 22 January and McDonald replied to a 
comment on 11 December 2019.  
 
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael would often share posts from members of the party. This 
means that the followers of their respective accounts would be the only Facebook 
users to see and share these posts directly. Instead of sharing from their party 
members’ profiles, Sinn Féin put up posts and tagged and/ or mentioned the 
accounts of the politicians involved. McDonald was frequently mentioned or tagged 
even when not directly involved in said post. As well as the followers of the Sinn Féin 
party, the friends and followers of each politician tagged or mentioned also see the 
post appear on their home feeds which broadens the audience. Sinn Féin also 
checks into locations on its Facebook page. For example, on 20 September 2019, 
Sinn Féin partook in a climate action strike. McDonald was tagged and the post 
checked into ‘Baile Átha Cliath’ which means that McDonald’s friends and followers 
as well as those of Sinn Féin saw this post and it appeared on the pages of both the 
party and the leader. It also means that any Facebook user who searched for Baile 
Átha Cliath on Facebook would also see this post.  
 
When mentioned in posts, Mary Lou McDonald and Pearse Doherty garnered a very 
positive reaction on Sinn Féin’s Facebook account. In the lead up to the election, 
both of these politicians were tagged and posted about increasingly frequently on the 
Sinn Féin Facebook page. Out of Sinn Féin’s most popular posts which were all 
videos, from 1 January to 8 February 2020, Doherty featured in four and McDonald 
featured in three. Each of these videos features at least one of these two politicians.  
 
According to Socialbakers, from 1 January to 8 February 2020, the most popular 
post on Sinn Féin’s Facebook account was on 27 January. It was a 1.5 minute-long 
clip of McDonald at the leaders debate on the Claire Byrne Live Programme on the 
same night. The caption was “And that's a knockout by Mary Lou 🥊” (Sinn Féin, 
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2020a). The top comment reads “She was brilliant, definitely time for a change I just 
hope everyone saying it will actually go out and vote” to which the Sinn Féin account 
replied: ”[User’s name] 100%. Remember to keep talking to all the people you know 
are looking for real change and remind them that the best way of showing this is to 
vote Sinn Féin on the 8th”. The post received 17,629 interactions which included 
1,227 comments, 4,935 shares and 11,467 reactions. Of these reactions, 99% (like 
and love) were positive and 1% (haha, wow, sad) were negative. The video reached 
389,639 views.  
 
1.8 TIME FOR CHANGE: 
Sinn Féin suffered what Carthy describes as a “bruising day at the polls back in May 
2019”. He discusses a “framework in terms of messaging and in terms of [Sinn 
Féin’s] organisation” which had been put in place before the local and European 
elections in May 2019: “Clearly, we hadn't done enough at that stage”. Among the 
lessons Sinn Féin learned after the May 2019 elections Carthy says that “[p]eople 
agreed with our policies but in many instances, they weren't aware of what our 
policies were”. He states that the party worked to define “the big issues of the day, 
particularly around housing, health, public finances, in terms of actually supporting 
workers and families”. He states that Sinn Féin was able to “use social media to 
direct the tenure of the campaign” in a way that they hadn’t in previous campaigns: 
“that was as a result of a number of years of really hard work on building up a social 
media presence, and using social media in a very clever way”. Carthy acknowledges 
that Sinn Féin was “fortunate in that there was very clearly a public mood for change, 
coming up to the 2020 election campaign”: 
 
 We were in a position because of the work that we had been doing over the 
previous months and years to utilise that and to, I suppose, concentrate the 
'vote for change' around the Sinn Féin policy platform and around the Sinn 
Féin team of spokespersons. 
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After the economic downturn in 2008, “[h]aving peaked in 2007, the GDP growth rate 
was negative for the next three years” (Robbins, Lapsley, 2014, p. 5). Robbins and 
Lapsley (2014) describe the financial agreement reached between the Irish 
government and Troika as a “financial straightjacket” (p. 3) on the Irish State. Public 
sector staff were hit with reduced rates of pay and a pension levy which took effect 
on 1 January 2010. This “resulted in an effective average reduction of 14 per cent in 
salaries of existing public sector staff as well as a pay freeze until 2014” (Robbins, 
Lapsley, 2014, p. 8). A National Recovery Plan was later published in November 
2010. This plan claimed that adjustments of nearly €15 billion  had been 
implemented in the previous two years and stated that an “additional €15 billion 
package of measures is required to bring the deficit back to below 3% of GDP by 
2014” (Government of Ireland, 2010).  
 
Social welfare expenditure was reformed to yield an intended €2.8 billion. Public 
service staff numbers were to be reduced with further pay cuts envisaged for those 
who remained. As well as this, third level education costs were to increase and water 
charges were due to be introduced in 2014. While maintaining the 12.5% corporation 
tax (exempting banks), €1.9 billion was to be raised through income tax “changes” 
(Government of Ireland, 2010). These were among the austerity measures 
introduced in Ireland from 2010. According to Robbins and Lapsley (2014), “the 
Government’s claim to place the citizen at the centre of public sector reform efforts 
[was] somewhat disingenuous in view of funding cuts in health, education, social 
services and policing” (p. 3). Sinn Féin opposed many of the proposed austerity 
measures at the time including the “introduction of water charges or of property taxes 
for primary homes” (Sinn Féin, 2011, p. 6). The party attended protest marches in 
opposition of the proposed water charges. Also contained in the party’s 2011 
manifesto were proposals to revoke the USC and other mandates enforced under 
the National Recovery Plan. The manifesto slogan was “There is a better way” (Sinn 
Féin, 2011, p. 2).  
 
By 2020, remnants of these austerity measures can still be seen. Ireland is currently 
in a housing crisis. According to Dr Reidy, health and housing were the two most 
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important issues to Irish voters in the 2020 general election. In ‘Housing in Ireland: 
From crisis to crisis’, Kitchin, Hearne and O’Callaghan (2015) write that “[s]helter and 
a sense of home is essential to our well-being… Housing provides us with sanctuary, 
a sense of identity and belonging, a firm base from which to venture out into the 
wider world” (p. 2). Therefore it can be an emotional issue for an electorate. They 
(2015) posit that the housing crisis in Ireland began during the Celtic Tiger years 
(1993-2006) and acknowledge that it was deepened by “austerity policies, placing 
severe stresses on households and the housing sector” (p. 3).  
 
As well as inflated rents and house prices, homelessness has increased 
exponentially in Ireland in recent years. According to Focus Ireland (2020), the 
number of people who are homeless (adults and children) and relying on emergency 
accommodation has increased from 3,845 in January 2015 to 10,271 in January 
2020 (Focus Ireland, 2020). The number of homeless children in January 2020 was 
3,574. Five years previous in January 2015, that number was 865 (Focus Ireland, 
2020).  
 
Public expenditure on health was also reduced during the recovery plan. Ireland is 
now experiencing a trolley crisis within the health sector. Numerous health scandals 
have been highlighted which led to a motion of no confidence being raised against 
the previous Minister for Health, Simon Harris. For those whose financial situation 
has worsened or stagnated since 2008 and continued to do so, Sinn Féin’s slogan of 
change resonated. Since the 2016 general election, De Bréadún describes the 
confidence and supply agreement as “a de facto coalition- a coalition without 
ministerial posts for Fianna Fáil”. Therefore it was easy for Sinn Féin to combine 
both parties in their criticisms of the “[y]ears of neglect and mismanagement by 
successive Governments” (Sinn Féin 2020, p. 17) 
 
In terms of messaging, De Bréadún comments that “their programme/ manifesto was 
fairly simple and straightforward”. Its slogan was short, concise and easy to 
understand: “Time for Change, Time for Sinn Féin” (Sinn Féin, 2020). Fine Gael’s 
manifesto slogan was much longer: “A future to Look Forward to, Building the 
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Republic of Opportunity” (Fine Gael, 2020) and Fianna Fáil’s slogan was slightly 
vague in its intentions: “An Ireland for All” (Fianna Fáil, 2020a). Sinn Féin’s manifesto 
highlighted everyday grievances of the public “speaking the language that other 
parties didn't manage to connect into”. Aiding them, according to De Bréadún, was 
“the fact that they hadn't been in government in Dublin [which] meant they didn't 
have to defend their record in that regard”.  
 
Discontent with the outcome of the economic crash of 2008 is still fresh in the minds 
of the public. Carthy details the campaign rhetoric of Fine Gael in 2016 as that “the 
government were saying 'keep the recovery going' and they [constituencies] were 
saying 'we haven't felt the recovery yet'”. Mullally comments on the fact that this 
rhetoric was still visible in the 2020 election:  
 
[T]hey’ve [Fianna Fáil and  Fine Gael] moved on from the crash, they’ve 
moved on from austerity. What they can’t see is that an awful lot of people 
haven’t because they haven’t been able to and Sinn Féin is representing 
those people. 
 
Mullally remarks on the “brand” that Sinn Féin created which was bolstered by its 
front bench throughout the campaign. This coincided with an identity crisis on behalf 
of the public with those in power and “the lack of calibre or engagement that people 
really have with any Fianna Fáil or Fine Gael politician”. Change became the selling 
point for the Sinn Féin party. The slogan “Time for Change, Time for Sinn Féin” was 
frequently quoted by the party throughout the campaign. It was also echoed in the 
comments sections of the Sinn Féin, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael Facebook pages. 
Fianna Fáil started to use the idea of change in the final week of the campaign. For 
example on 3 February 2020, Fianna Fáil posted an amalgamation of its own and 
Sinn Féin’s campaign slogan “It's time for change. Join us in building an Ireland for 
all” (Fianna Fáil, 2020b). The top comment of this post ends by writing: “call it a day 
you've passed your sell by date”.  
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION 
 
A number of factors contributed to Sinn Féin’s unexpected rise in first-preference 
votes in February 2020. As seen in Chapter II, since its inception Sinn Féin had links 
with the IRA. With ostensible member-crossover happening at leadership level, 
these links remained inextricable for many voters and politicians in the years 
following the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Despite the party consistently 
contesting elections since February 1987, it was only in the general election of 
February 2016 that the party reached double figures with 13.85% of first preference 
votes. The party’s poor performance in the local and European elections of May 
2019 seems to have occurred at the beginning of a new campaign strategy which 
reaped its rewards less than a year later in February 2020.  
 
According to Sinn Féin TD Matt Carthy, the party had implemented a number of 
frameworks in terms of messaging and organisation prior to the local and European 
elections in 2019: “Clearly, we hadn't done enough at that stage”. After these 
elections in May, the party sourced feedback on what went wrong. It realised it was 
perceived as criticising the policies of the incumbent government without offering any 
solutions to rectify what they saw as issues. In turn the party intensified measures 
regarding messaging and party-organisation thereafter. One way it did this was 
through its social media platforms.  
 
In an interview with Pat Kenny in May 2020, TD Pearse Doherty, claimed that the 
party’s use of social media was a large contributing factor in their success with Irish 
voters. The research for this thesis shows that Sinn Féin’s social media campaign 
was much more successful than that of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. The date range 
was set to the week beginning on 4 August 2019 until election day six months later 
on 8 February 2020. This time frame was chosen to allow for trends in data and 
social media tactics to become visible. The platforms examined were Facebook, 
Instagram and Twitter. Most members of the public use Facebook more often than 
Instagram and Twitter which is reinforced by the higher volume of posts, interactions 
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and following garnered by the parties’ Facebook accounts. As a result, particular 
emphasis was placed on this platform in the analysis in Chapter IV.  
 
In the six-month time frame, Sinn Féin started out with the highest number of 
followers. This increased by 17% in these six months. The Sinn Féin account began 
to consistently reach triple-figure daily follower-increases from the announcement of 
election day on 14 January throughout the election campaign. Its highest daily 
increase of page likes during the six month timeline occurred on 22 January when 
the account received 1,700 page likes. This was also the day that Sinn Féin’s 
Facebook page saw its second highest viewership on one of its videos during the 
election campaign. The video was 1.45 minutes in length and featured Pearse 
Doherty on a Virgin Media News panel outlining Sinn Féin’s proposed tax reforms to 
combat the health and housing crises with particular emphasis on applying 
corporation tax to the banking sector. Throughout the six months prior to the general 
election, Sinn Féin put 415 posts on its Facebook page which is an average of 69 
posts per month. Of these 415 post, 97% of the reactions were positive and 3% were 
negative. 328 of these posts contained videos which received a total of 13,620,905 
views.  
 
In comparison, Fine Gael’s following of the same six-month time period went from 
37,278 page likes to 38,158. This is an increase of just over 2% and 151,547 less 
page likes than that of Sinn Féin by election day. During these six months Fine Gael 
posted 84 times which is an average of 14 posts per month. Of these 84 posts, 449 
were videos which reached a total of 2,420,572 views which is approximately 18% of 
Sinn Féin’s viewership. 60% of the public reaction to Fine Gael’s posts was positive 
and 40% was negative. Fianna Fáil’s following increased in these six months by just 
under 3%. It posted 175 times which is an average of 29 times per month. 116 of 
these were video posts and received a total of 3,708,253 views, approximately 73% 
less than that of Sinn Féin during this time. 68% of the reactions to Fianna Fáil’s 
posts were positive and 32% were negative.  
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One tactic Sinn Féin used in these six months was frequency. It posted 240 more 
times than Fianna Fáil in the allotted time-frame and 331 more times than Fine Gael. 
Fine Gael’s total number of interactions was 67,571, Fianna Fáil’s was 64,711 
whereas Sinn Féin’s equivalent in the same time frame was 750,358. On Instagram 
Leo Varadkar posted over twice as often as McDonald and Martin and had the most 
popular Instagram account out of the three leaders. Other tactics employed by the 
Sinn Féin Facebook account were frequently replying to users and posting links to 
petitions and to the Sinn Féin website where one can sign up to become a member 
of the party. The account would also ask to hear the experiences of its followers and 
when hosting a Facebook live video, it would often ask its followers where they were 
watching from. This promotes a type of inclusion and interactivity which was not 
visible on the pages of Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil.  
 
Sinn Féin politicians also sometimes replied to comments on the account’s posts. 
One such occurrence led Pearse Doherty to provide his office phone number to a 
user to talk about her concerns with the party. He also provided her with a day and 
time that he would be available to talk. In the final weeks of the election campaign, 
Fianna Fáil did a Facebook live video nearly every day. However, it did not seem to 
interact directly with its followers. While Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil frequently shared 
posts from its party members Facebook pages, Sinn Féin would post, tag and/ or 
mention the politicians involved as well as the location where the event in question 
was taking place. This broadens its viewership past that of its own followers and 
places these posts in front of the friends and followers of those tagged and/ or 
mentioned as well as anyone searching the location which was checked into.  
 
The Instagram and Twitter pages of each of the three parties was also examined 
during the research phase. On Instagram Sinn Féin performed much stronger than 
Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil. By election day Sinn Féin’s Instagram account had 
25,356 followers and had seen 88,745 interactions from the week beginning 4 
August 2019 and 8 February 2020. Fine Gael had 85 % fewer followers than Sinn 
Féin by election day and Fianna Fáil had 83% fewer. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s 
respective Instagram accounts had 93% fewer interactions than that of Sinn Féin. 
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Sinn Féin’s Twitter following and interaction-rate was also substantially stronger than 
those of Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil. 
 
The social media accounts of each of the three leaders were also examined. Mary 
Lou McDonald’s Facebook presence was far superior to that of Micheál Martin and 
Leo Varadkar. However, Leo Varadkar had the most successful Instagram account. 
By election day, Varadkar had 24,792 followers on Instagram while McDonald and 
Micheál Martin had 3,505 and 1,234 respectively. Varadkar’s account saw a total of 
51,864 interactions in the six months prior to election day. McDonald received 4,429 
interactions and Martin received 1,557.  Varadkar seems to have posted more 
habitually. He uploaded 46 posts between August 2019 and election day, McDonald 
posted 17 times and Martin whose account was only established in January 2020 
posted 12 times. As well as posting more frequently, Leo Varadkar has been on 
Instagram longer than Martin and McDonald have been. His first post is dated 3 April 
2017 while McDonald posted for the first time nearly two years later on 8 January 
2019 and Martin first posted on 10 January 2020.  
 
Since Varadkar’s speech regarding COVID-19 on 12 March, his Instagram following 
has seen a surge in activity with the former Taoiseach’s following going from 26,177 
followers on 12 March to 174,137 on 19 July. The largest single increase in following 
his account saw in this time was on 17 March when it increased by 23.68%. On this 
day Varadkar appeared in his second National COVID-19 address.  
 
Another area of research examined Sinn Féin’s messaging. The research outlines 
that Sinn Féin’s messaging was clear. It also posted its message on its social media 
channels more frequently. Sinn Féin’s campaign slogan which was the title of the 
foreword of its manifesto was “Time For Change, Time For Sinn Féin” (Sinn Féin, 
2020). The layout of the party’s manifesto was straight-forward. On the cover it 
features McDonald, Doherty (both smiling) and Eoin Ó’Broin underneath the caption 
“Giving workers & families a break, A Manifesto for Change” (Sinn Féin, 2020). The 
social media analysis discussed in Chapter IV show that McDonald, Doherty and 
Ó’Broin were selling points for the party. Therefore featuring them on the cover of the 
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party’s manifesto was astute. The physical layout of each page was also the simplest 
with most sections containing a title, a body of text and bullet points at the end to 
summarise the section. The party’s lexical choices in its manifesto generally 
reflected every day speech and its rhetoric on social media and in the public eye. 
This makes it easier for the average person to read and decipher.  
 
As the research outlines, there were a series of events throughout the election 
campaign which worked in Sinn Féin’s favour regarding its approval ratings. One 
such incident was the near-exclusion of Sinn Féin’s leader Mary Lou McDonald from 
an RTÉ leaders debate involving Micheál Martin and Leo Varadkar. This decision 
was implemented earlier in the campaign by Virgin Media News before the second 
Ipsos MRBI political opinion poll was released. This worked to increase the party’s 
support from the Irish electorate by reinforcing the anti-establishment rhetoric of the 
party and positioned Sinn Féin as an ‘underdog’ per se. The research also concludes 
that the relatively new leader of the party and its spokespersons represent a 
generational shift and have helped to move the narrative around the party away from 
its links with the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Without focussing on these elements 
and with the addition of the expertise of the party’s spokespersons, Sinn Féin 
positioned itself as a genuine contender for government in the Republic of Ireland in 
2020.  
 
Past events and perceived inadequacies on behalf of previous governments were 
one of the largest contributing factors to Sinn Féin’s performance in the 2020 
election. The aftermath of the economic crash can still be felt by much of the 
electorate today due mainly to the health and housing crises Ireland has 
experienced. Sinn Féin’s approach to these issues in their manifesto were state-led 
and the party claims they are attainable through their proposed tax reforms which 
they briefly outline on pages 109 and 110 of their manifesto . Their opponents 
contradicted them throughout the campaign. However, the Irish electorate is often 
confronted by expense-scandals, reports of mismanagement of money and TD 
salaries which are much higher than their own.  
 
 63 
The current administration were also in government when the banks were bailed out 
after the economic crash of 2008 and as highlighted in Sinn Féin’s 2020 manifesto, 
these banks do not pay corporation tax. From the research conducted through 
interviews, it seems there is a lack of an ability on behalf of Irish voters to identify 
with politicians in Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil. In opposition is the anti-establishment 
rhetoric of the Sinn Féin party which seems to resonate with the anger of much of 
the Irish electorate- much the same as how the Podemos party in Spain and the 
Syriza party in Greece won majorities for the first time.  
 
A recent Ipsos MRBI opinion poll conducted in June 2020 revealed that Fine Gael 
has risen significantly in its party support since its handling of COVID-19. It now has 
37% party support. Sinn Féin maintains its 25% party support while Fianna Fáil’s 
support has decreased by 9 points to 14% (The Irish Times/ Ipsos MRBI, 2020). On 
27 June, 140 days after the general election in February 2020, Fianna Fáil, Fine 
Gael and The Green Party entered into coalition with Micheál Martin serving as the 














CHAPTER VI - APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Party Facebook data 
Sinn Féin 
Date range: 04/08/19- 08/02/20 
Table 1 






views Page likes 
Post 
Count 
Aug '19 9392 7495 688 514 570 58 67 1631 5110 18 363336 162706 26 
Sep '19 26374 23279 431 1737 132 629 166 4159 14471 42 996782 163818 55 
Oct '19 52913 45031 1918 4258 975 400 331 9106 34775 51 2551675 166195 64 
Nov '19 43607 37958 1006 3798 289 366 190 6150 20385 66 1710123 166836 82 
Dec '19 54416 47310 1037 4399 1173 309 188 6712 28887 52 2349743 168698 64 
Jan '20 202485 180513 3330 17100 396 781 365 24446 85970 74 4628718 184467 93 
Feb '20 87908 77084 101 10314 73 161 175 8959 22502 25 1020528 189705 31 








(angry, sad, laugh, shock) 
 460790 16305 
Percentage 97 3 




Date range: 24/11/18- 24/05/19 
Table 1.2  







views Page likes 
Post 
count 
Nov '18 2863 2599 25 193 2 10 34 706 1358 19 111140 156645 23 
Dec '18 18418 16019 298 1395 87 529 90 3441 10640 56 714478 157453 63 
Jan '19 23785 20395 280 1984 195 749 182 3805 17103 71 1120561 158345 81 
Feb '19 21634 19014 255 1974 115 92 184 3265 15723 79 999703 159295 84 
Mar '19 28650 24352 365 2702 756 355 120 3936 14507 81 836398 160437 92 
Apr '19 23232 20397 346 2017 280 101 91 3095 11425 86 836099 160943 103 
May '19 25723 23000 268 2095 33 267 60 3252 13350 105 914065 161488 119 








(angry, sad, laugh, shock) 
 138136 6169 
Percentage 96 4 





Date range: 04/08/19- 08/02/20 
Table 1.4 






views Page likes 
Post 
Count 
Aug '19 1346 1122 19 77 110 16 2 526 268 0  0 37278 4 
Sep '19 320 252 23 9 1 34 1 221 78 2 9749 37305 3 
Oct '19 661 539 28 34 1 57 2 698 185 3 12801 37304 3 
Nov '19 592 445 54 11 1 80 1 614 63 2 4812 37275 11 
Dec '19 478 341 67 15 4 51 0 671 52 0 0 37287 4 
Jan '20 18427 9151 4084 337 91 4696 68 16499 2618 23 1742574 37814 31 
Feb '20 12505 8100 1498 300 41 2530 36 8835 1914 19 650636 38158 28 





Positive reactions  
(like, love) 
Negative reactions 
(angry, sad, laugh, shock) 
 
 20733 13596 
Percentage 60 40 





Date range: 04/08/19- 08/02/20 
Table 1.6 






views Page likes 
Post 
Count 
Aug '19 847 649 42 16 8 131 1 572 201 3 57812 37552 8 
Sep '19 1367 1142 94 39 8 75 9 455 228 16 100039 37561 23 
Oct '19 1680 1322 150 57 18 131 2 925 338 15 81029 37577 23 
Nov '19 2827 2165 173 117 19 340 13 1525 729 15 264167 37607 30 
Dec '19 2083 1319 481 47 21 204 11 1841 553 11 350355 37624 15 
Jan '20 17720 10351 3234 337 314 3411 73 12580 3821 35 2519442 38230 48 
Feb '20 8757 6162 660 243 23 1645 24 4493 1169 21 335409 38564 28 








(angry, sad, laugh, shock) 
 23966 11315 
Percentage 68 32 





Party Leaders’ Facebook data 
Mary Lou McDonald 
Date range: 04/08/19- 08/02/20 
Table 2 
Month Reactions Like Angry Love Sad Laugh Shock Comments Shares 
Total 
interactions Page likes 
Post 
Count 
Aug '19 9154 7650 232 431 720 100 21 1394 1351 11899 99932 28 
Sep '19 6748 5719 291 371 89 239 39 1303 1076 9127 99826 28 
Oct '19 15077 13051 668 862 115 243 138 2641 1914 19632 99875 37 
Nov '19 8473 7443 182 632 157 27 32 712 768 9953 99953 39 
Dec '19 23006 19808 54 2443 250 338 113 3167 9736 35909 102137 27 
Jan '20 71435 63225 1135 6796 96 129 54 10438 16156 98029 110999 36 
Feb '20 70536 60511 20 9856 4 113 32 8744 10381 89661 116660 18 






(angry, sad, laugh, shock) 
 198798 5631 
Percentage 98 2 
Data sourced from CrowdTangle and Socialbakers databases. (2020) Mary Lou 




Date range: 04/08/19- 08/02/20 
Table 2.2 
Month Reactions Like Angry Love Sad Laugh Shock Comments Shares 
Total 
interactions Page likes 
Post 
Count 
Aug '19 1151 784 1 79 286 1 0 117 41 1309 39394 1 
Sep '19 5090 4517 109 328 5 111 20 1572 417 7079 39891 14 
Oct '19 3357 2851 196 207 7 89 7 1793 428 5578 40228 10 
Nov '19 3282 2403 520 140 37 172 10 2641 629 6552 40426 15 
Dec '19 2780 1712 666 166 15 209 12 2662 655 6097 41129 6 
Jan '20 10907 7109 1879 515 28 1352 24 8888 1408 21203 42236 20 
Feb '20 9110 5455 1260 398 19 1959 19 6484 761 16355 42580 11 








(angry, sad, laugh, shock) 
 26664 9013 
Percentage 75 25 
Data sourced from CrowdTangle and Socialbakers databases. (2020) Leo Varadkar 




Date range: 04/08/20- 08/02/20 
Table 2.4 
Month Reactions Like Angry Love Sad Laugh Shock Comments Shares 
Total 
interactions Page likes 
Post 
Count 
Aug '19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18825 0 
Sep '19 487 452 11 7 2 14 1 120 65 672 18823 11 
Oct '19 668 547 50 14 11 45 1 510 142 1320 18850 7 
Nov '19 555 451 58 10 6 29 1 409 101 1065 18841 8 
Dec '19 594 531 15 25 3 18 2 179 84 857 18869 6 
Jan '20 3422 2958 185 80 10 179 10 1548 320 5290 19139 12 
Feb '20 788 714 20 18 0 35 1 356 97 1241 19295 2 








(angry, sad, laugh, shock) 
 5807 707 
Percentage 89 11 
Data sourced from CrowdTangle and Socialbakers databases. (2020) Micheál Martin 




Party Instagram data 
Sinn Féin 
Date range: 04/08/19- 08/02/20 
Table 3 






Aug '19 5223 145 5368 1 2390 385 0 10 
Sep '19 10227 205 10432 5 10865 581 0 21 
Oct '19 6146 147 6293 2 3897 716 1 13 
Nov '19 14582 263 14845 7 15644 868 0 22 
Dec '19 18818 391 19209 7 28849 1208 5 22 
Jan '20 24668 441 25109 9 53266 3687 0 25 
Feb '20 7320 169 7489 1 7678 2355 0 4 
Total 86984 1761 88745 32 122589 9800 6 117 
Data sourced from CrowdTangle and Socialbakers databases. (2020) Sinn Féin 












Date range: 04/08/19- 08/02/20 
Table 3.1 






Aug '19 522 15 537 1 371 70 7 3 
Sep '19 257 11 268 3 2022 70 1 3 
Oct '19 265 26 291 2 1530 73 5 3 
Nov '19 88 5 93 1 399 70 7 2 
Dec '19 41 13 54 0 0 51 13 1 
Jan '20 2488 206 2694 12 19552 496 1 20 
Feb '20 1912 119 2031 12 9340 255 0 17 
Total 5573 395 5968 31 33214 1085 34 49 
Data sourced from CrowdTangle and Socialbakers databases. (2020) Fine Gael 















Date range: 04/08/19- 08/02/20 
Table 3.2 






Aug '19 178 4 182 2 846 41 9 4 
Sep '19 807 10 817 5 1532 80 3 12 
Oct '19 501 21 522 4 1731 226 0 9 
Nov '19 972 37 1009 10 4263 85 9 23 
Dec '19 363 19 382 6 3140 74 6 9 
Jan '20 1891 81 1972 14 8182 565 2 25 
Feb '20 1233 103 1336 8 4111 252 0 16 
Total 5945 275 6220 49 23805  1323 29 98 
Data sourced from CrowdTangle and Socialbakers databases. (2020) Fianna Fáil 














Party Leaders’ Instagram data 
Mary Lou McDonald  
Date range: 04/08/19- 08/02/20 
Table 4 
Month Like Comments Total interactions Video posts Video views Post Count 
Aug '19 962 23 985 0 0 7 
Sep '19 1391 44 1435 0 0 6 
Oct '19 1307 40 1347 0 0 3 
Nov '19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dec '19 643 19 662 0 0 1 
Jan '20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Feb '20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 4303 126 4429 0 0 17 
Data sourced from CrowdTangle and Socialbakers databases. (2020) Mary Lou 












Date range: 04/08/19- 08/02/20 
Table 4.1 
Month Like Comments Total interactions Video posts Video views Post Count 
Aug '19 3644 185 3829 0 0 3 
Sep '19 14515 571 15086 1 7806 11 
Oct '19 9162 489 9651 5 42886 9 
Nov '19 10012 359 10371 0 0 10 
Dec '19 775 86 861 1 9402 2 
Jan '20 7116 810 7926 5 60623 7 
Feb '20 3869 271 4140 3 30434 4 
Total 49093 2771 51864 15 151151 46 
Data sourced from CrowdTangle and Socialbakers databases. (2020) Leo Varadkar 















Date range: 04/08/19- 08/02/20 
Table 4.2 
Month Like Comments Total interactions Video posts Video views Post Count 
Aug '19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sep '19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oct '19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nov '19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dec '19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jan '20 874 37 911 4 3798 10 
Feb '20 614 32 646 1 1534 2 
Total 1488 69 1557 5 5332 12 
Data sourced from CrowdTangle and Socialbakers databases. (2020) Micheál Martin 












Party Twitter Accounts 
Sinn Féin 







Mentions Tweets Total interactions Like Replies Retweets 
Aug '19 651 2 728 276 20724 14703 17 6004 
Sep '19 971 0 3223 314 28506 19414 408 8684 
Oct '19 1918 0 16206 317 44335 28900 2262 13173 
Nov '19 1232 0 15425 293 38594 26576 1600 10418 
Dec '19 1866 0 14491 208 33578 24689 1264 7625 
Jan '20 6465 5 862 315 108999 85132 27 23840 
Feb '20 4423 0 1099 87 51156 40746 13 10397 
Total 17526 7 52034 1810 325892 240160 5591 80141 





















Mentions Tweets Total interactions Like Replies Retweets 
Aug '19 198 8 451 6 404 315 0 89 
Sep '19 357 0 2445 24 878 665 7 206 
Oct '19 550 0 12246 32 1534 930 293 311 
Nov '19 315 0 14364 8 1034 646 196 192 
Dec '19 271 7 10588 27 988 558 269 161 
Jan '20 1880 0 2733 287 12878 9569 24 3285 
Feb '20 670 0 1007 156 10642 8048 16 2578 
Total 4241 15 43834 540 28358 20731 805 6822 






















Mentions Tweets Total interactions Like Replies Retweets 
Aug '19 224 7 212 63 1213 829 26 358 
Sep '19 269 1 1541 128 2064 1352 150 562 
Oct '19 398 0 6299 124 1937 1176 245 516 
Nov '19 889 0 7329 152 2772 1742 377 653 
Dec '19 225 12 6952 91 1968 1141 404 423 
Jan '20 1694 0 545 267 7533 5195 42 2296 
Feb '20 598 0 451 61 2459 1818 6 635 
Total 4297 20 23329 886 19946 13253 1250 5443 
















Party Manifesto Content Analysis 
Table 6 
Party Word Count 
 
% Criticisms % Self-endorsements 
% Priorities/ 
government agenda 
Sinn Féin 47084 19.77 2.6 77.54 
Fine Gael 49507 1.81 21.02 77.1 
Fianna Fáil 39492 12.5 2.3 85.16 

















Lexical content analysis of manifestos 
Table 6.1 





Sinn Féin 451 0 0 
Fine Gael 49 210 41 
Fianna Fáil 42 8 129 
Successive (Irish) governments/ administrations 7 0 0 
Fine Gael supported by Fianna Fáil/ Fianna Fáil 
supported by Fine Gael 5 0 0 
Change 24 28 36 
All 166 102 101 
Future 32 75 63 
Opportunity 13 102 101 
Workers 103 39 25 
Fail/ failed/ failing/ failure 35 2 9 
Equal/ equality 41 15 23 
Inequal/ inequality 24 4 7 
Power 23 10 6 
Insurance 45 12 15 
Free 49 29 26 
Privatisation 12 0 1 
Investment 86 65 62 
Underfunded/ underfunding 12 0 0 
Bank(s)/ banker(s) / banking 53 20 14 
Immediate/ immediately/ urgently/ urgent/ now 34 39 20 
People 200 188 125 
Citizen 26 26 40 
Child/ children 170 110 129 
Disability/ disabilities 84 33 57 
Brexit 24 39 39 
European Union/ EU 56 38 104 
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Community/ communities 122 144 155 
Rural 32 39 62 
Business/ businesses 52 40 36 
Landlord(s) 2 7 5 
Welfare 14 28 14 
Travellers 27 11 13 
Crisis 28 8 27 






Appendix G  
Interview participants 
Deaglán De Bréadún 
Interviewed by Bethany Langham on 17 June, 2020 
Deaglán De Bréadún is an Irish journalist and author. De Bréadún spent much of his 
journalistic career working with The Irish Times where he held a number of positions 
including Northern Editor, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, Political Correspondent 
and Irish Language Editor. He also held the position of Political Editor of The Irish 
Sun from 2014-2015. De Bréadún has written two books in English (The Far Side of 
Revenge: Making Peace in Northern Ireland, 2001; Power Play: The Rise of Modern 
Sinn Féin, 2015) and three books in Irish (Sceallóga, 1990; Cinnlínte: Saol an 
Iriseora, 2016; Scéalta Nuachta, 2016). De Bréadún now writes an Irish political 
column for the Belfast-based newspaper The Irish News.  
 
Dr Theresa Reidy 
Interviewed by Bethany Langham on 1 July, 2020 
Dr Theresa Reidy is a political scientist in the Department of Government at 
University College Cork (UCC). Dr Reidy specialises in electoral behaviour and 
political institutions. She has been funded to carry out political research by bodies 
such as the European Commission, the Irish Research Council, the Department of 
an Taoiseach and the Department of Foreign Affairs. Dr Reidy has co-edited two 
books (The post-crisis Irish voter, 2018; Electoral Management; Institutions and 
Practices in an Established Democracy, 2016). She has authored and co-authored 
many peer reviewed journals, book chapters, published reports, conference 
publications and newspaper and magazine articles. Dr Reidy has also contributed to 
a number of government policies including policies around emigrant voting and a 
Joint Houses of the Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution. Among other 







Interviewed by Bethany Langham on 22 June, 2020 
Matt Carthy is a Sinn Féin Teachta Dála (TD) for the Cavan-Monaghan constituency. 
He was elected to the Dáil in the February 2020 general election. Prior to this, Carthy 
served as a Sinn Féin Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for the Midwest-
Northern constituency from 2014 to 2020. While a Monaghan County Counsellor he 
served on Carrickmacross Town Council and Monaghan County Council. Carthy was 
Sinn Féin’s Director of Elections for the 2016 general election and is the party’s 
current Spokesperson for Agriculture   
 
Rachael English 
Interviewed by Bethany Langham on 2 July, 2020 
Rachael English is an Irish radio presenter, journalist and author. She has presented 
on a number of radio programmes including Five Seven Live (now Drivetime),  and 
currently presents Morning Ireland on RTÉ Radio One. English began her radio 
career at Clare FM in Ennis. Since joining RTÉ she has also worked on RTÉ 2FM, 
the News at One and Today with Pat Kenny. English has co-hosted RTÉ’s election 
coverage since 2002. She has also authored five novels (Going Back, 2013; Each 
and Every One, 2015; The American Girl, 2017; The Night of the Party, 2019; The 
Paper Bracelet, 2020).  
 
Una Mullally 
Interviewed by Bethany Langham on 1 July, 2020 
Una Mullully is an Irish journalist and author. She began writing for The Irish Times in 
2011 and now writes a weekly column for the newspaper. Mullally also writes opinion 
pieces for The Guardian. She is a regular contributor to current affairs programmes 
and documentaries for news organisations such as RTÉ and the BBC. Mullally has 
also presented programmes for TG4. In 2014, Mullally’s book In The Name Of Love 
was published. It is an oral history of the movement campaigning for marriage 
equality in Ireland. Mullally has received many awards for her writing and activism 
including Online News Association Women’s Leadership Accelerator (2019) and one 
of IMAGE’s Women of the Year (2018).  
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Appendix  
Sample questions from interviews:  
Deaglán De Bréadún 
• What do you think were the turning points for Sinn Féin during the 2020 
election campaign? 
• Do you think there were any events in the last 5 years which may have 
influenced Sinn Féin’s success in the 2020 election? If so, what were they? 
• In your book Power Play, you mentioned that if Mary Lou McDonald was the 
leader of Sinn Féin, the party would potentially appeal to more voters. She 
had been leader for over a year before the May 2019 elections, yet the party 
performed very poorly. How do you think she achieved this turn-around ahead 
of the 2020 election? Or do you think she had anything to do with it at all? 
• What was Sinn Féin’s biggest obstacle coming into the 2020 election? 
  
Dr Theresa Reidy:  
• What do you think was the most attractive element of Sinn Féin’s 2020 
campaign to voters? Could you see a difference strategy-wise between their 
campaign in 2020 and that of 2016? 
• What do you think Sinn Féin’s strongest policy-proposals were going into the 
election? 
• Do you think there was anything that Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael did or didn’t 
do to influence the popularity of Sinn Féin with voters/ influence their own 
popularity with the Irish public? 
• Do you think Sinn Féin have entrenched themselves firmly in the public eye 
as one of ‘the big three’ in Irish politics or can you see them fading away after 
the excitement of the last few months now that they are in opposition? 
 
 Matt Carthy 
• Can you tell me the main duties of the Director of Elections within Sinn Féin 
(assuming they differ from party to party)?  
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• What was your primary focus in this role for the 2016 general election? 
• Could you see a difference between the campaign strategy in 2016 and that 
of 2020? 
• How do you think Sinn Féin managed to perform so well in the 2020 election 
given the party’s performance in the local elections less than a year previous 
in May 2019? 
  
Rachael English 
• What do you think was the most attractive element of Sinn Féin’s 2020 
campaign to voters?   
• Were there any events during the campaign you think may have influenced 
their appeal to the public? 
• Do you think there was anything that Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael did or didn’t 
do to influence the popularity of Sinn Féin with voters? 
• Sinn Féin performed poorly in the 2019 local and European elections. Many 
say they learned their lessons from this experience. Could you see a change 




• What do you think was the most astute aspect of Sinn Féin’s campaign 
strategy in 2020?   
• Are there any members of the party who you think may have particularly 
enticed voters? 
• Were there any events during the campaign you think may have influenced 
Sinn Féin’s appeal to the public? 
• Do you think the exclusion of Sinn Féin by some media outlets and other 
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